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ABSTRACT
There have been many claims made that the creation of the majority-black district
has led to a more conservative Congress, both in terms of roll-call voting behavior and
partisan membership. I contend that there is a direct relationship and an indirect
relationship between the creation of majority-black districts and increased conservatism
in the House. The direct relationship focuses on the roll-call voting behavior of the
House member. The indirect relationship focuses on the partisan makeup of the House.
The analysis is couched in broad-based rational choice theory, asserting that incumbent
House members and prospective House candidates behave strategically in an effort to
achieve electoral success. In addition, I assert that the 1990s redistricting yield ongoing
and lasting effects.
The dissertation is divided into roll-call voting behavior and candidate emergence
analyses. According to the roll-call voting behavior analysis, House members respond to
the changes in racial composition directly after redistricting, but do not remain responsive
several years after redistricting. Instead, House members respond to the level of black
population in the mid-1990s. The responsiveness differs for non-white and white House
members. The larger the black population, the more liberal the non-white House member
and the more conservative the white House member. Thus, House members in
1995/1996 are not responding to the changes in racial composition, but rather to the level
of black population.
According to the candidate emergence analysis, in 1994, House members who
were not responsive to changes in the racial composition of their district were faced with
higher quality challengers. Furthermore, the higher quality challengers tended to identify
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with the Republican Party. When focusing on the South, lack of responsiveness again
attracts higher quality candidates. However, the candidates are no more likely to identify
with either party.
The race-based redistricting of the 1990s did have some immediate effects and
may have indirectly influenced the increased conservatism in the House of
Representatives. However, there does not appear to be strong evidence to suggest that
the redistricting produced direct or long-term effects toward conservatism in the House.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The decade is just two short years from a close, and yet there is still uncertainty
and dissatisfaction with the redistricting that took place in the early 1990s. In the past,
redistricting was a relatively static process. At the beginning of a ten-year period
congressional districts are reapportioned based on population shifts, and district lines are
drawn to reflect the changes. Ideally, for that ten-year period the district lines remain the
same, and candidates campaign and win within the specific and semi-permanent district
boundaries. Although states have experienced multiple redistricting in the past, the
uncertainty that accompanies the 1990s districts is unprecedented. During the ten-year
period that started in 1990 and will end in the year 2000, there have been over 15
challenges to majority-minority districts that were created in the South.1 Lawsuits
challenging the districts drawn after the 1990 census began as early as 1991 in Texas,
North Carolina, Alabama, and South Carolina. After several court cases, five of which
went to the Supreme Court, districts are still in flux in North Carolina, South Carolina
and Virginia. The relentless amount of litigation throughout the South has served to keep
House members, as well as prospective challengers, guessing what their congressional
districts will look like for the next election.
With each lawsuit there is the prospect of district line changes. And with this
possibility, there are changing incentives for all actors involved. For instance, the
creation of majority-black districts in the early 1990s gave blacks an incentive to run

1 Court cases surfaced in all eight southern states that created majority-black districts. Court cases in
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas made it to the U.S. Supreme C o u rt
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viable black candidates. For many districts this marked the first time in years that there
was the possibility that a black candidate could win the congressional seat. By the same
token, these districts changed the incentives for white House members and candidates
both Democratic and Republican. Some white Democrats had to decide if they would
run in a district that had a very large black population. Some white moderate
Republicans had to decide if they would abandon their moderate platforms and move
further to the right to reflect the reduction in black population in their districts due to the
redistricting aims.
Due in large part to the intervention of the judicial branch into the redistricting
process, several district lines changed between the 1992 and 1996 elections. Therefore,
what was once a relatively static process has now turned into a dynamic process in the
1990s. The possibility of district lines changing has remained throughout the this tenyear period, and accompanying each court case and subsequent district line change is the
possibility of a shift in incentives for those affected by the congressional boundaries.
It is important to put the preceding discussion into context. One of the major
goals of the 1990s redistricting was to increase the representation of minorities in the
United States Congress. Achievement of the goal was attempted, in large part through
the creation of majority-black congressional districts.2 These districts were formed by
concentrating at least 55-65% of blacks in a district in order to insure the election of a
black candidate. By most accounts the policy worked as expected. Of the 23 AfricanAmerican members in the 1980s, only one-sixth of those members represented southern
2 Eight majority-Hispanic districts were created nationwide in 1992. These districts have also been
challenged in Texas, Illinois and New York. For the most part, however, the effects of the 1990s
redistricting are focused on majority-black districts in the South.
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districts. Between 1991 and 1993, the number of African-American members of
Congress grew from 27 to 40, largely as a result of the creation of several majority black
districts. The strategy of the redistricting was aimed at the southern states. Accordingly,
the South is where the impact was the greatest. Of the 27 African-American members in
1991, only five of them were from the South. In stark contrast, of the 17 AfricanAmericans elected between 1992 and 1994,13 of them were from the South.
Although the numbers of African-Americans in Congress have increased, the
1990s redistricting may ultimately threaten the overall representation of AfricanAmericans. There have been many claims made both by scholars and political pundits
that the creation of the majority-black district has led to a more conservative Congress,
both in terms of roll-call voting behavior and partisan membership. Although there is
increasing diversity in the political interests of blacks, as a group they still remain
overwhelmingly liberal and Democratic.3 Therefore, a more conservative Congress is
seen as jeopardizing the overall representation of black interests rather than enhancing it.
I contend that there is a direct relationship and an indirect relationship between
the creation of majority-black districts and increased conservatism in the House. The
direct relationship focuses on the roll-call voting behavior of the House member. Simply
put, the change in black population in a district leads to change in roll-call voting
behavior. The indirect relationship focuses on the partisan makeup of the House. As we

3 In Katherine Tate’s From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections 1993, the
author explores the political views of blacks by studying their response from the National BlackEIection
Study (NBES). Tate finds that although African Americans have become more conservative in terms of
ideology in the last thirty years, they are still overwhelmingly liberal. An analysis of an National Election
Study (NES) policy position table spanning 36 years shows that blacks have remained liberal across a wide
range of policy issues.
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know the Republicans took control over the House in 1994 and some believe that the
creation of these districts influenced that shift in party control. The idea here is that
majority-black districts are formed by removing blacks from surrounding districts. These
subsequent districts are now “bleached” or more white, and by the simple fact that a large
liberal voting bloc has been pulled from these districts, the district is now more
conservative, and more attractive to prospective Republican candidates.
How could the creation of majority-black districts lead to a more conservative
Congress? As mentioned above, when majority-black districts are formed, the
surrounding districts are “bleached”, because they have lost a substantial portion of their
black population. Many political observers contend that House members in these
“bleached” districts will change their roll-call voting behavior to better reflect the
interests of their new constituency, which has a higher white population proportion than
previously. Therefore, as a result of the creation of one majority-black district, there may
be several House members who become less liberal in their roll-call voting behavior due
to the loss of a large liberal voting bloc.
Political observers also claim that the loss of large numbers of Democratic House
seats in 1994 can be attributed to the creation of majority-black districts. In 1992 there
were three Democratic incumbents defeated as a direct result of the creation of majorityblack districts. The defeated members were Ben Erdreich of Alabama, C. Thomas
McMillen of Maryland and Jerry Huckaby of Louisiana.
The 1994 election marked the first time since Reconstruction that Republicans
made up a majority of the southern congressional delegation. Many techniques have
been used in an attempt to determine how many of the Republican victories were direct
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results of the creation of majority-black districts. The different techniques have
generated variant results. I will discuss these results in the next chapter.
Perhaps more important than determining the actual number however, is
understanding why the districts would cause such upheaval. As Bullock (1995:22-23)
explains, “[bjetter [Republican] candidates, Democratic incumbents trying to defend their
records before more conservative constituents, and perceptions that winning might be
possible. . . ” all played a role in making Republican candidates competitive. Thus, the
“bleached” districts may have attracted more experienced and qualified Republican
candidates.
There are two major themes that will be addressed throughout the dissertation.
First, the redistricting of the 1990s represents a dynamic process in which the effects of
the changing boundaries must be looked at across time. Many past studies on this topic
look at the effect of the changing district racial composition on a House member’s rollcall voting behavior for a one year or two year period (Bullock 1995; Overby and
Cosgrove 1996; Lublin 1997; Sharpe and Garand 1994, unpublished). Instead, I argue
that there are both delayed effects as well as on going effects of the 1990s redistricting.
Second, and more broadly, this dissertation is an attempt to understand better
congressional responsiveness in general, and more specifically the representation of black
interests at the congressional level.
In this dissertation I seek to answer the following questions: (1) Was the
congressional responsiveness in roll-call voting behavior observed in 1993 maintained
years after the initial redistricting? (2) Did southern states where race-based redistricting
occurred have a relatively higher rate of quality candidate emergence than the rest of the
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nation? (3) Were House members who were not responsive to changes in racial
composition of their districts, met with more quality challengers?
By answering these questions, this dissertation begins to answer the larger,
overarching question of whether black congressional representation is impaired by the
creation of majority-black districts. In particular, the question to be answered is whether
the formation of majority-black districts inadvertently led to a more conservative
Congress in both its roll-call voting behavior and its partisan makeup.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The 1990s redistricting fits into an historical context that is very important to the
arguments developed in this dissertation. Redistricting, as we know it has existed since
the early 1960s. What then makes the 1990s redistricting so different from redistricting
in the past? There are two answers to that question: (1) race, and (2) more importantly,
reactions to the redistricting.
Race continues to be an intense issue in the United State as a whole, as well as in
the political arena in particular. The 1990s round of redistricting affected the political
system like no other redistricting before it. Through the manipulation of district lines,
districts were created that allowed black candidates a chance to win election to the U. S.
House of Representatives. Up through the 1980s many of the southern states drew
district lines in such a way to deny black citizens the opportunity to elect a representative
of their choice. The 1990s redistricting attempted to correct this trend, and was met with
high levels of resistance. The 1990s, however, is not the first time blacks were elected to
Congress in large numbers and it is not the first time that their election fostered
resistance.

6
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African-Americans entered the U. S. Congress for the first time in 1870 during
Reconstruction. The number of African-Americans serving in Congress between 18701901 averaged five members. However, with the overthrow of Reconstruction, AfricanAmerican members were threatened, injured, and murdered in the attempt to remove all
African-Americans from Congress. In 1901 the last African-American, George White of
North Carolina, was purged from Congress. African-Americans did not return to
Congress until 28 years later when Oscar Depriest of Illinois was elected to the House of
Representatives. In the southern states the wait was longer. Barbara Jordan of Texas and
Andrew Young of Georgia marked the re-entrance of African-Americans into Congress
with their election to the House in 1973. For other southern states like Louisiana,
Alabama, Florida, North Carolina and South Carolina, blacks did not serve in Congress
again until approximately ninety years after the resignation of Congressman White in
1901.
During post-Reconstruction and the years that followed, African-Americans in the
South were effectively removed from political life through tactics such as the poll tax,
literacy tests, the grandfather clause, and lynching. Although there were small victories
in the struggle for suffrage from 1900 through the 1960s, the most significant gain did not
come until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). The VRA of 1965 prohibited voting
qualifications or prerequisites to voting or any standard practice, or procedure by any
state or political subdivision that would “deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color.” The Act was different from previous
attempts to end racial discrimination in the political arena. Unlike the Voting Rights Acts
of 1957, 1960 and 1964, it demanded compliance by giving the Justice Department

7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

authorization to intervene in the political activities of states with a history of racial
discrimination in the election process.
Yet, with all of its good intentions, the VRA of 1965 was unable to eliminate all
forms of racial discrimination in the electoral process. One of the most common methods
used to minimize the number of black elected officials was the racial gerrymander. Black
voting power was undermined through one of two basic techniques. A congressional
redistricting plan can effectively disperse electoral strength, or it can over-concentrate
electoral strength. These techniques are respectively known as diluting and packing.
When diluting takes place, a large black population is broken down into several smaller
groupings and divided into surrounding districts where they make up a minority of the
district population. The result is that the blacks do not have power in numbers to elect
their chosen candidate in any of the districts. When packing occurs, the amount of blacks
in a particular district far exceeds the amount of blacks needed to elect a representative of
their choice. Consequently, votes that could be used elsewhere are wasted. In addition,
the likelihood of a black candidate being elected in diminished considerably in the
districts bleached to create majority-black districts. Both of these techniques diminish
the electoral efficiency of blacks as a group.
Throughout history blacks have considered the Court a safe haven where their
complaints could be heard and their needs met. Blacks looked to the courts because the
other branches of government did not seem willing to aid blacks in their struggle for
social, economic, and political advancement. The issue of redistricting proved no
different.

8
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Before the 1960s, state and federal courts were reluctant to intervene in matters
involving reapportionment or congressional redistricting. These issues were considered
to be political question, better answered by another branch of government or by the
electorate. However, the Court heard a case in 1960 that set the scene for further court
involvement in redistricting and reapportionment concerns. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the
Court held that the Alabama Legislature could not draw city limits for the city of
Tuskegee in such a way that would exclude almost all black voters.
The 1960s case was considered one of the few exceptions to the rule of no court
involvement in apportionment and redistricting matters. However, the precedent was
broken with the historic 1962 Baker v. Carr decision. In its decision the Supreme Court
established the principle of population equality in districts, and the Court has continued to
exercise great influence in the area of apportionment and redistricting ever since.4
Two court cases that were most influential in the 1990s formation of minority
black districts were City o f Mobile v. Bolden and Thornburg v. Gingles. In the case of the
City of Mobile v. Bolden the majority “ .. .held that a voting rights suit grounded on the
Fourteenth Amendment must demonstrate that a questioned practice or law was
established or maintained with racially discriminatory intent" (Grofman, Handley and
Niemi 1992:35). Therefore, the burden of proof would be placed on the plaintiffs of such
cases to prove that the discrimination that occurred as a result of a certain plan was
purposeful. This decision gave rise to emotional criticism and protest. Members of the

4 Emphasized in the majority opinion of Baker v. Carr was the belief that the federal judiciary had the
power to review the apportionment of state legislatures under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.
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civil rights community demanded answers for what they considered to be a blatant
disregard for the fundamental right to vote.
The civil rights community received the answer they were looking for a couple of
years later with the passage of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. These
amendments were in direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in City o f Mobile v.
Bolden. Congress passed an amendment that eased the burden of proof for those alleging
discrimination in voting rights matters. Section 2(a) of the amended Voting Rights Act
states that:
. . . . no voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results (emphasis added) in a denial or abridgment of the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f) (2) (Voting Rights Act
Section 2 Amendment).

The Act now prohibited any practice that had the result of discrimination, regardless of
the lawmakers’ intent.
The amended Voting Rights act did not provide guidelines as to how courts were
to determine whether vote dilution existed. Therefore, many different interpretations
surfaced in the lower courts. The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the courts’ position
in the 1986 decision in Thornburg v. Gingles. The Court upheld the “result” test laid out
in the 1982 amendments and developed a three-pronged test to assess vote dilution
claims. The following three conditions have to be present before vote dilution could be
considered: “ . . . . First the minority group must be . .. sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority of a single-member district. . . . Second,
the minority group must be . . . politically cohesive . . . . Third, the white majority votes
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sufficiently as a bloc to enable i t . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate”
(Thornburg v. Gingles 478 U.S. 30,1986). This case was considered a major victory for
the civil rights community, as well as a signal to state legislatures to establish majorityblack districts wherever possible.
In considering the 1990s redistricting, the Justice Department applied the
requirements laid out in Gingles rather broadly. Under the Voting Rights Act, the Justice
Department must pre-clear redistricting plans in 14 states with a history of racial
discrimination.5 In these states the Justice Department pressed for state legislatures to
draw more majority-minority districts than already drawn. In essence Justice Department
approved plans resemble more of a proportional type of electoral system in which the
number of majority-minority districts roughly coincide with the proportion of minorities
in the state.6
This prodding was reflected in the 1992 congressional elections. Prior to the 1992
elections, the 11 southern states held 116 congressional seats, only five of which were
held by African-Americans, even though about 25% of the population in these states is
black (Leo 1992:33). After the elections, 12 new southern House seats were won by
African-Americans, bringing the southern total to 17 and the national total to 40.
In addition, the 1992 elections marked the first time since Reconstruction that
blacks won congressional seats in Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina and

5 The states requiring pre-clearance are Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
6 Lani Guinier (1994) contends that a proportional type o f electoral system would eliminate the need for
race-based redistricting all together.
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Virginia. Louisiana and Texas increased black membership by one seat, and Georgia
gained two black seats in 1992.
Although the number of majority-minority districts remains fairly small, their
creation has been met with much resistance. The resistance has manifested itself in a
series of cases heard by the Supreme Court. The first case to be heard by the court was
Shaw v. Reno. A suit was filed by five white North Carolinians who claimed that their
14th Amendment right to “equal protection under the law” had been violated due to the
creation of two meandering majority-black districts. The court ruled that the plaintiffs
were entitled to raise concerns under the 14th Amendment because “bizarrely shaped
districts designed to promote minority voting strength may violate the constitutional
rights of white voters.” The court did not attempt to answer whether the creation of
majority-minority districts was always a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but it
did rule that the plaintiffs might have a valid complaint (Kaplan 1993:1762).
The ruling was seen as a victory to opponents of the majority-minority districts
and a defeat to proponents of the majority-minority district. Opponents of the districts
claimed that the ruling simply meant that the drawing of district lines with race having a
disproportionate or exclusive role is prohibited. Proponents of the districts felt that the
ruling jeopardized majority-minority districts and invite litigation aimed at dismantling
the districts.
One of the biggest criticisms of the Shaw v. Reno ruling was that there seemed to
be a double standard set for redistricting based on incumbency, partisanship, and other
minorities versus redistricting based on race, specifically African-American.

12
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In his dissent Justice John Paul Stevens verbalized this feeling:
‘If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for
rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for
Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for
members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth
to the Equal Protection Clause’ (Kaplan 1993:1763).
The Court’s focus on the “bizarreness” of the shape of a district also seemed
contradictory to some observers. The following example illustrates the problem that
critics have with the ruling. In the state of Texas there were four unusually shaped
districts. Two of the four districts were declared unconstitutional due to a district court
ruling that implemented the Shaw v. Reno decision. It is difficult if not impossible to
examine an illustration of these districts visually and determine which ones the court
struck down. All four districts seem to violate the compactness standard, and they all
seem bizarrely shaped. The two districts struck down were district 18 which is 50.9
percent African-American, and district 29 which is 60.6 percent Latino. In the same
decision district 6 which is 90.9 percent white and district 3, with 89.3 percent white were
upheld.
The vagueness of the Court’s Shaw v. Reno decision led to a series of court cases
challenging the creation of majority-minority districts. Several cases have reached the
Supreme Court.
The first case that applied the Shaw decision in order to strike down a redistricting
plan originated in Louisiana. In July 1992, three whites and one black filed suit
challenging the congressional districts drawn for the 1990s. They argued that the
creation of these districts stripped the subsequent minority group of all of their political
power. The number of whites in the majority-black district was too small to have any
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political impact. Conversely, the black plaintiff argued that blacks left in the now ultra
white districts also did not have any political influence because of their small numbers.
In Hays v. Louisiana, a three judge panel ruled that “the length the Legislature went to in
creating the second of two black districts exceeded the limits implicit in the Supreme
Court’s Shaw ruling” (Kaplan 1994:29). When the case went to the Supreme Court many
hoped that the Court would set specific guidelines for states that felt a need to establish
majority-minority districts. However, this was not the case. In United States v. Hays, the
Court ruled that the plaintiffs in the case had no grounds to sue because they did not live
in the contested 4th district.
Oral arguments in Miller v. Johnson, a case from Georgia, were heard along with
the H ays’ arguments. In the 1993 Shaw decision the Court expressed its concern with
“bizarreness of shape.” The court went a step further in the Miller decision, explaining
that a peculiar shape is just one indication that race might have played an extreme role in
constructing districts. In the majority opinion, the Justices questioned any districting plan
in which race was the “predominant factor.” In order to show that race was a
“predominant factor” in creating districts, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said ‘a plaintiff
must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles .
.. to racial considerations’ (Idelson 1995:1946). In other words, if race is more important
in shaping districts than compactness, contiguity, political subdivisions, and common
interests, there are grounds for suit. On June 13,1996, the Supreme Court solidified its
position on race-based redistricting. In the North Carolina case of Shaw v. Hunt, and the
Texas case of Bush v. Vera, the court ruled that both states focused too much on race and
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not enough on the traditional districting principles when they created four majorityminority districts. This decision follows the precedent set in the Miller case a year
earlier. With this ruling the Court struck down both states’ congressional district maps.
This brief history illustrates the circumstances that lead up to the 1990s
redistricting, and the atmosphere in which the redistricting took place. In addition, it
highlights the continuing court battles that still, as of the 1996 elections, make the
southern districts uncertain.
CONCLUSION
It is not enough to examine House members’ roll-call voting behavior the year
after redistricting was completed. Instead we must consider House member’s
responsiveness once the focus has been taken off of the 1990s round of redistricting.
Equally important is the fact that roll-call voting behavior is not the only factor to
consider when determining the possible conservative effect that the race-based
redistricting had on Congress. Included in this study is a discussion on the role of the
1990s race-based redistricting on the emergence of quality Republican candidates in
subsequent elections.
The combination of roll-call voting behavior and candidate emergence analyses
will facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the role the race-based redistricting of
the 1990s played in the creation of a more conservative Congress.
Plan of the Dissertation
The next chapter discusses the previous literature related to the topics in this
dissertation. I draw from several bodies of research including rational choice theory,
strategic politician theory, challenger quality research, congressional responsiveness
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research, and race-based redistricting research. Scholarly contributions in each of these
bodies of work are examined in this chapter.
Chapter 3 proposes a broad-based rational choice theory. How would we expect
politicians, as rational actors, to respond to the race-based redistricting of the 1990s? The
prospect of changes in district boundaries induces incentive changes in incumbent rollcall voting behavior as well as the challengers’ decision to run. This is the point of
departure for the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4 describes the data and methods used to test the propositions outlined
previously. This dissertation focuses on several different questions and thus, depends on
many different sources of data. Roll-call data are utilized, as well as election results, and
challenger quality information.
Chapter 5 examines whether the responsiveness observed directly after the initial
redistricting in 1992 signaled a sustained change in roll-call voting behavior among
affected House members, or have those members reverted back to their pre-redistricting
behavior.
Chapter 6 explores the effect that changing district lines have had on challengers’
decision to run for office. Did the more quality challenger run in 1994 and 1996 in
districts and states that had been affected by race-based redistricting?
Chapter 7 discusses the results and their implications for representation in the 21st
century. The 1996 congressional elections may have marked the end of court ordered
race-based redistricting. What effect this may have on the ability of African-Americans
to win election in the House of Representatives will be discussed in this chapter.

16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In Chapter 1, a general theory of congressional roll-call voting behavior and
candidate emergence was presented. The theory is based on the proposition that the
1990s redistricting has proven to be a dynamic process that has yielded continued
changes in both roll-call voting behavior and candidate emergence throughout the decade.
Arguments constructed in this study are drawn from several different bodies of literature.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the literature and explain its relevance in the
context of this dissertation.
The first area of research focuses on roll-call voting behavior. The main issue
addressed in this research is the degree to which House members are responsive to
changes in the constituency composition. The study focuses on how roll-call voting
behavior responds to changes in district composition due to the enactment of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as well as the decennial redistricting process.
The second area of research deals with candidate emergence. Candidate
emergence literature focuses on two main areas. First, the literature analyzes what type
of potential candidates run for office. Second, the research examines what national and
local factors determine who runs for office, and when they run for office. Examples of
both of these arguments are included in the review of the literature.
The last area of research analyzed in this chapter is in the beginning stages of
development. After Republicans took control of the Congress in 1994, many political
observers began to question whether there was a causal relationship between the creation
of majority-black districts and the Republican sweep. The studies supporting and
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refuting that claim are included in this section. These are the first attempts at trying to
explain candidate emergence in the 1990s as it relates to the race-based redistricting that
occurred.
ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR
The framework of this dissertation is based on the theory that the United States
House of Representatives, deemed to be the most representative institution in our
government, is in fact responsive to constituency interests. Given this, it is important to
determine whether this legislative system, which boasts accountability, is in fact
accountable to the people. As numerous scholars have suggested, reelection is the
primary goal of House members (e.g., Fiorina 1974; May hew 1974; Fenno 1978). If this
is the case, we should expect to see House members’ attempting to gamer constituency
support through many forms of behavior, including roll-call voting.
Pitkin (1967) describes representation as “acting in the interest of the represented
in a manner responsive to them.” Like Pitkin’s definition, most definitions of
representation center around the idea of policy responsiveness, which refers to the
congruence between the constituents' opinions and interests and the representative’s
legislative actions. However, it is important to note a more inclusive definition of
representation. Eulau and Karps (1977) claim that representation is a multidimensional
concept. In addition to policy responsiveness, they maintain that there is service
responsiveness, which is the representative’s ability to render services to constituents.
Allocation responsiveness refers to the representative’s ability to bring government
projects from Washington to the district (pork). Last, symbolic responsiveness refers to
the representative's ability to offer political gesture to improve trust and popularity.
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Although the present study focuses more directly on policy responsiveness, it is
necessary to mention the other forms of representation. There are some benefits to
having a black representative that are not as easily measured as policy issues, but they
may fall into one of the other three dimensions of representation. For instance, Fenno
(1978) recounted a conversation between a House member and one of his staffers. The
congressman stated that he concedes the black vote. In reference to a black
neighborhood they were driving through, the staff member says - “I wouldn’t want to be
out there walking on the sidewalk.” The congressman replies that “[i]t’s like some
Caribbean country” (Fenno 1978:21). In stark contrast, former Congressman Cleo Fields
of Louisiana walked the streets of rural, predominately black areas in the state. In many
areas the people remarked that he was the first congressman who ever came into their
neighborhood to listen to their concerns.1 It is difficult to quantify the value of an
attitude change that might occur when a person feels that their representative is interested
in their opinion.
In this dissertation I explore representation and responsiveness as it is affected by
redistricting. Redistricting refers to the drawing of constituency boundaries with the
purpose of redistributing congressional seats designated to a state. Morrill (1981:17-28)
enumerated criteria for redistricting. He explained that there are two criteria, which are
based on the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The criteria were not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution, but rather became law as a result of judicial interpretation
of the Constitution. The first criterion, equality of population, states that congressional
districts should be as equal in number as possible. The second criterion is equal
1 Interview with Congressman Cleo Fields (D-LA), January 20, 1995.
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probability of representation. This refers to the drawing of congressional districts that
give racial and ethnic minorities an equitable chance of representation. The other criteria
are strongly advocated, but not required by law. They are as follows: (1) congressional
districts should conform where possible, to local boundaries, commentates of interest,
and lines of communication; (2) congressional districts should be as geographically
compact as possible and no part should be completely unconnected with the rest of the
district. (3) congressional districts should be drawn to be as fair as possible between
political parties; and (4) congressional districts should foster party competition and
alternation.
Much of the pre-1990s research on redistricting focuses on whether there is
partisan influence in the redistricting process, and if there is, who benefits from it.
Glazer and Robbins (1985) use the backdrop of redistricting to test for the impact
of changing partisan composition of the constituency on a representative's vote behavior.
The authors develop a cross-sectional model of roll-call voting behavior, and then take
the coefficients from that model to generate predicted changes in roll-call voting based on
changes in the partisan composition after redistricting. They find that changes in partisan
composition due to the 1980s redistricting led to changes in representatives’ vote
behavior that reflected the partisan changes.
Another study that shows evidence of congressional responsiveness is Fleisher
(1993), who finds that the level of southern Democratic liberalism has increased over
time due to several factors. First of all, with the emergence of legitimate two-party
politics in the South, Republicans have begun to forge competitive campaigns. Fleisher
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explains that the presence of formidable Republican candidates leads Democratic
candidates to further differentiate themselves from Republican candidates in an effort to
secure the vote of liberal blacks and whites. These efforts by Democratic candidates are
reflected in the liberalization of their roll-call behavior.
As this subject relates to race there have been conflicting findings. In a study that
focuses exclusively on the roll-call voting behavior of southern House members, Whitby
and Gilliam (1991) find that southern Democratic members of Congress became more
liberal after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The authors attribute the
altered vote behavior to House members' effort to accommodate the surge of black, and
mainly liberal, constituents. They also find evidence of generational replacement. The
responsiveness toward the more liberalized electorate is not only evidenced in current
House members’ roll-call voting behavior, but also in the increased liberalism of new
members entering the House.
Combs, Hibbing and Welch (1984) study the effect of changes in black
population on congressional roll-call voting over an eight year period. These authors find
that in the North and the urbanized South, the liberal roll-call voting behavior of the
representative increases as the black population in a district increases. This is the
expected relationship if the House member is responsive to changes in black population.
However, in the rural South, there is a curvilinear relationship. When the black
population is small, the member’s roll-call voting behavior is more conservative. As the
black population grows, a member’s liberalism increases up until a point. When the
black population is relatively large (30-40%), the liberal vote behavior of the House
member decreases.
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Two studies in particular ask probing questions about the effects of race- based
redistricting before the issue was thrust on to the national agenda in the mid-1990s.
These studies have laid the groundwork for an entire body of research that took root after
the 1990s redistricting.
Grofman, Griffin and Glazer (1992) explore whether an increase in the black
population leads to a higher probability that a Democratic candidate will be elected to
office. The authors find that in both the Southern and non-Southern states, a certain
threshold must be reached in black population before it will have an effect on the party
and ideological identification of the winning candidate.
For instance, if there are two southern districts, one with 55% black and the other
with 15% black, the authors contend that it would be more beneficial to the Democratic
party, to divide the blacks in those district evenly. When divided evenly, each district
could have 35% black population. Grofman et al. (1992) find that southern districts that
have 30 to 40% black population will almost definitely elect a liberal Democratic
candidate. Outside the South the same phenomenon occurs, however, the threshold is
lower. Democrats and liberals are elected with 20-30% of the population being black.
The authors make an important point in this article. The threshold for securing a
Democratic candidate is much lower than the threshold for securing a black candidate.
Therefore, so the argument goes, it does not benefit the Democratic Party to form
majority-black districts. What appears obvious from this study is that for white
Democrats, majority-black districts waste votes.
In a second study, Handley, Brace and Grofman (1987) ask the question “Does
Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Help Republicans?” In this state level study, they

22

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

find that the necessary packing of Democrats into a district in order to insure the election
of a black representative results in surrounding districts being overwhelmingly
Republican. The authors claim that the creation of majority-black districts, and the
consequent wasting of Democratic votes, leads to an unintended consequence, the loss of
Democratic districts.
Grofman and Handley (1991) ask whether the increase in black legislators in
southern state legislature between 1965 and 1985 was due to whites’ new willingness to
vote for blacks, or whether the increase is due to redistricting aims that increased the
number of black majorities and eliminated vote dilution tactics. They find that the
number of black officials has increased because the number of black majority districts
has increased, not because whites are voting blacks into office. The elimination of
multimember districts, along with enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, is the
major contributing factors of the increase in black legislators.
Although Grofman and Handley find support for a claim that many political
observers also find to be true, there are political science scholars who think differently.
Themstrom (1987), Swain (1993), and Lublin (1997) all suggest that black legislators can
be elected in congressional districts that do not have a black majority. In fact, Swain
suggests that, instead of exerting effort on increasing black representation through the
creation of black districts (a process which she argues has been exhausted), blacks should
attempt to gain political strength in districts that are represented by white Democrats.
She also asserts that black representatives should seek (and can win) office in majoritywhite districts.
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The works by Swain (1993) and Lublin (1997) are part of a flurry of research that
has been carried out following the 1992 congressional elections. This body of research
focuses on the effect of changing black population on a House member’s liberalism
(Bullock 1995; Lublin 1997; Sharpe and Garand 1994, unpublished) and on sensitivity
towards black issues (Overby and Cosgrove 1996; Whitby 1997). Lublin (1997), Sharpe
and Garand (1994, unpublished), and Overby and Cosgrove (1996) all observe a change
in white House members’ roll-call voting behavior as a result of the changing racial
composition in his district due to redistricting. As the black population in a district
decreases due to redistricting, the House member’s roll-call voting behavior becomes
more conservative.
Bullock (1995) offers a different finding. He examines districts in which black
population increased, and finds that an increase in aggregate black population across the
districts led to an increase in liberal roll-call voting behavior. Yet, when he disaggregates
his findings by race, he observes that only black legislators have increased their
liberalism in response to increases in the black population. In actuality, white House
members do not exhibit substantial increases in black population and do not change their
roll-call voting behavior because of the increases.
Similarly, Whitby (1997) does not find a significant relationship between racial
composition changes and the roll-call vote of white House members. However,
regardless of this finding, Whitby emphasizes that black substantive representation
suffers if Democrats lose seats in surrounding districts due to the creation of a majorityblack district.
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The difference in the results of the above studies is somewhat puzzling because
the same general methodology was used for each. However, the measurement of the
dependent variable changed from study to study. Several different types of
measurements of ideology were used Committee on Political Education (COPE),
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), Americans for Democratic Action
(ADA), Poole and Rosenthal, and each measures a slightly different phenomenon.
Substantive Versus Descriptive Representation
Many critics of race-based redistricting contend that the creation of majorityblack districts may actually weaken, rather than strengthen, the overall representation of
black interests. The line of reasoning goes as follows: In order to create a majority-black
district, black citizens are taken from surrounding districts in order to pack enough blacks
into a district so to ensure the election of a black representative (Grofman and Handley
1989; Grofman et al. 1992; Lublin 1997). As a result of the expulsion of part of their
black population, the surrounding districts are proportionately more white, and
presumably, more conservative. Consequently, the change in the demographic and
ideological characteristics of the constituency results in more conservative roll-call voting
behavior on the part of the representative. It also results in an increased likelihood that a
Republican or conservative Democrat will be elected in the district.
At the root of this criticism is the debate over whether descriptive or substantive
representation is the desired relationship between a representative and his constituents.
In her 1967 book, The Concept of Representation. Pitkin defined substantive
representation as the correspondence of goals between the representative and the
constituency. Descriptive representation is the correspondence of demographic
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characteristics between the representative and the represented. Pitkin asserted that the
more effective form of representation is substantive representation because it implies “ ..
. acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (1967:209)
(emphasis added). She claimed that we mistakenly “ . . . assume that people’s
characteristics are a guide to the actions they will take .. .the best descriptive
representative is not necessarily the best representative for activity or government”
(1967:89). Pitkin asserted however, that descriptive representation could be accompanied
by substantive representation to bring about effective government.
The inclination of many scholars however, is to address descriptive and
substantive representation in an either-or manner. For instance, Swain (1993) and Lublin
(1997) both suggest that substantive black representation is compromised due to the
increased number of black representatives. However, these two forms of representation
are not mutually exclusive. In fact, in the case of the dyadic relationship between a black
House member and his/her constituency, substantive representation usually accompanies
descriptive representation. As stated earlier, blacks as a group remain markedly liberal.
As research has shown, the same can be said for the average black Democratic House
members. They are more liberal than the white members of their party regardless of
region (Tate 1993; Bullock 1995; Lublin 1997; Sharpe and Garand 1994, unpublished).
This is really an issue of dyadic versus collective representation (Weissberg
1978). Even if black House members are responsive to their constituents (dyadic
representation), if their election leads to a House that is collectively less substantively
representative of blacks, then as Swain (1993) purports, black faces do not necessarily
correspond to black interests. On the other hand, if white House members do not become
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more conservative in response to the loss of liberal blacks in their districts, then
substantive representation is not damaged by an increase in black House members.
Swain acknowledges that, although the strategy of creating majority-black
districts in order to increase black representation has been exhausted, there is one
advantage. The black members elected in the early 1990s now may benefit from
incumbency advantage. This seems to have been the case in the 1996 congressional
elections. Civil rights activist and members of the Congressional Black Caucus were
concerned with the prospect of losing majority-black districts due to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in 1993, 1995, and 1996.
In response to the Court’s decisions new state district maps were drawn in
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas. In all four of these states the majority-minority
districts were struck down and new districts were drawn. Cleo Fields of Louisiana did
not choose to run in the new district. However, the black House members in Florida,
Georgia and Texas chose to run in the new districts that were no longer majority-black.
Representatives Corrine Brown of Florida, Cynthia McKinney and Sanford D. Bishop of
Georgia, and Sheila Jackson-Lee, and Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas were all reelected
under the new district plans. Many political observers believe that these black House
members benefited from their incumbency status. It is doubtful whether a non-incumbent
black candidate could have won in these districts.
This brings us to an interesting point that has been articulated by Gerber (1996).
He examines the black members of the House of Representatives in terms of their career
patterns. Specifically he looks at the exit rate of black House members, and compares
this with all other members of Congress. Gerber finds that black House members have a
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substantially lower exit rate than other House members. In particular white Democrats’
exit rate is five percent higher than black Democrats’ exit rate. Gerber (1996:840)
explains, “As a result of low exit rates, African American members of Congress will have
more seniority than the average Democrat. When there is a Democratic majority, their
high seniority levels will lead to a sizable number of African American chairs of
important committees and subcommittees.” Therefore as Gerber suggests, even if the
number of African Americans in Congress does not significantly increase, those members
who did win election due to the 1990s redistricting aims, may prove to be a very
powerful and influential tool of black representation.
Canon, Schousen and Seller (1996:848) combine representation and candidate
emergence to examine how “politicians respond to the changing electoral context
imposed by new district lines . . . . ” The authors claim that the newly constructed
majority-black districts foster a politics of commonality rather than a politics of
difference, due to the type of candidate more likely to win in these districts.
According to the authors, the new majority-black districts attract several different
types of black candidates, and possibly some white candidates. They distinguish between
“traditional” and “new-style” black candidates. Traditional blacks practice a politics of
difference, while new-style blacks practice a politics of commonality. What types of
candidates run for office will determine what type of politics will be practiced.
The authors contend that in the new majority-black districts, a biracial coalition
consisting of white voters and moderate black voters will elect the winning candidate. In
a challenge between a traditional and new-style black candidate, the new-style black
candidate will gamer the support of the ideologically moderate biracial coalition.
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The percentage of blacks in majority-black districts has fallen and the percentage
of whites in these districts has grown. Because of this, whites in the district can play a
pivotal role in determining whether a traditional or new style black candidate will win
election. Unlike traditional black candidates who focus on issues of race, new style black
candidates focus on their political experience and expertise, it is this expertise that
makes the new style candidate more attractive to the white electorate. Through personal
interviews, newspaper articles, and various political journals, the authors were able to
identify ideological leanings of the candidates. They found that about half of the newly
created majority-black districts elected new style black candidates who practice a
“politics of commonality”.
Canon et al. begin to ask the question of how the new electoral context created by
the majority-black district affects candidate emergence and constituency representation.
Most of the research on the impact of the 1990s redistricting focuses on the same general
question: what effect does the increase or decrease of black population have on a House
member’s roll-call voting behavior? In this dissertation 1 broaden the scope. The 1990s
redistricting signaled a dynamic process that cannot be explored by simply examining
roll-call vote behavior for a one-year or two-year period. This six-year period of change
has fostered many changing incentives, which affect who, and when people run for
office, who votes, how people vote, and who wins.
CANDIDATE EMERGENCE
The discussion of candidate emergence, and more importantly, quality candidate
emergence, in congressional elections is part of a larger debate on whether national or
local forces are most influential in determining the presence of a quality challenger in an
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election. Scholars who believe national forces have the most impact on election
outcomes focus on presidential coattails, midterm election effects and economics to
explain the results (Tufte 1975; Calvert and Ferejohn 1983; Campbell 1985; Campbell
1986; Cover 1986; Campbell 1991; Cohen, Krassa and Hamman 1991). On the other
hand scholars who believe local forces have the most impact on election results focus on
incumbency advantage and challenger quality (Mayhew 1974; Ferejohn 1977; Fiorina
1977; Johannes and McAdams 1981; Jacobson and Wolfinger 1989).
Jacobson and Kemell (1983) integrate national and local forces to develop a
model of the strategic politician. The authors argue that career politicians are sensitive to
both local and national conditions when calculating their probability of electoral victory.
In fact, it is not the voters who consider national forces when choosing a congressional
candidate, rather it is the strategic politician who incorporates national factors into their
decision to run for office, which in turn colors the campaign and the outcome of the
election.
The idea espoused by Jacobson and Kemell, that potential candidates calculate the
utility of running for office, is a concept that has commonly been applied to candidate
emergence literature.
Rohde (1979) construct a theory of progressive ambition in order to determine
how U.S. House members decide whether or not to run for the governorship or a Senate
seat. The term progressive ambition, borrowed from Schlesinger (1966), refers to
incumbent politicians who seek to gain a higher or more attractive office. Rohde tests
several hypotheses about progressive ambition based on the probability that the House
member will win office, the value of the higher office, the value of the current office, and
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whether members are risk takers. Rohde concludes that House members do consider the
above conditions when deciding whether to run for higher office.
Brace (1984) extends Rohde’s work by analyzing the extent to which Rohde’s
conditions, such as the value of the current and higher office, increase or decrease the
likelihood that a House member would run for higher office.
Other scholars have adopted the strategic politician concept to explain why
quality challengers emerge in some congressional races and not in others.
Using campaign finances and political experience as a measure of challenger
quality, Bond et al. (1985) attempt to explain why certain incumbents attract quality
challengers. They analyze 1980 House races in which an incumbent member’s seat is
challenged. The factors that affect whether an incumbent attracts more quality
challengers deal with partisan forces such as the previous vote for the incumbent, whether
the incumbent is a member of the dominant party in the district, and whether the national
tide is in the incumbents favor. Another factor that affects challenger quality is whether
the incumbent’s policymaking has remained aligned with the interests and policy
preferences of his/her constituents.
Krasno and Green (1988) also attempt to understand what has a larger effect on
challenger quality emergence, local or national forces. National forces refer to the
nationwide standing of the challenger’s party. Local forces are defined as the
challengers’ party vote percentage in the previous election. Krasno and Green develop a
measurement of challenger quality based on attractiveness and political skill to test the
relationship. They find that the local political climate has the largest effect on a quality
challenger’s decision to run for office.
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Two scholars that apply challenger quality analysis to the U.S. Senate are Squire
(1989) and Lublin (1994). Squire analyzes Senate elections from 1980 to 1986, and finds
the main factor in determining whether a high quality challenger will emerge is the size
of the pool of potential candidates. Larger states by their very nature have more avenues
for office seekers to enter politics. Consequently, those states have a larger pool of
potential candidates who have had some political experience. Further Squire finds that
high challenger quality translates into higher amounts of campaign contributions.
Lublin (1994) develops a scale of political experience to determine what type of
political experience is most beneficial in regards to U.S. Senate elections. Focusing on
elections from 1952 to 1990, Lublin finds that members of the U.S. House of
Representatives receive a higher proportion of the vote than governors, lesser statewide
officials, former senators, local officials, or state legislators. Many studies have focused
on whether the local or national political climate has a larger influence on the decision of
quality challengers to enter a congressional race (Bond et al. 1985; Bom 1986; Krasno
and Green 1988; Squire 1989; Lublin 1994). I add to this body of literature by applying
the strategic challenger theory to the 1990s elections. National conditions are believed to
have played a role in the election outcomes in the 1992 through 1996 elections.
However, the main concern in this dissertation is the effect that local conditions had on
the emergence of quality challengers and outcome of the elections; more specifically, the
local conditions of interest center on black population shifts and congressional
responsiveness to these shifts.
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ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR AND CANDIDATE EMERGENCE
Since the Republican Party gained control of Congress in 1994, there has been
much speculation over whether the creation of majority-black districts was in some way
responsible for the shift in party control. Many political researchers and pundits assert
that the race-based redistricting gave rise to Democratic seat losses in 1992 and 1994.
The most important empirical study to date is by Hill (1995). He explores the
direct impact of “. . .the actual reduction in percent black to the point that Republicans
become either competitive or actually win in districts controlled by Democrats”
(1995:400). Hill examines the electoral and district-level census data for congressional
districts in eight southern states. He finds that in the 1992 election, of nine seats that
Republicans won in states in his analysis, four were due to the creation of majority black
districts.
Hill concludes that, although race-based redistricting has had an impact on the
southern electoral system, Republican candidates won seats in all types of districts,
regardless of whether they did or did not lose black population. He claims that this is just
a sign that the South finally has a legitimate two-party system.
Bullock (1995) simply looks at the number of seats a Republican won by a margin
smaller than the reduction of the black voters in a district. He finds that in 1992, there
were six districts where this was the case. In 1994 three more Democratic districts were
lost as a result of the race-based redistricting.
Contrary to these findings, a report published by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
(1994) asserts that the creation of majority-black districts actually saved the Democratic
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Party some seats that would have otherwise been included in the Republican sweep in
1994.
These works look at the question of what impact the creation of majority-black
districts has had on Democratic seat losses by simply observing whether districts, which
lost black population proportions, were won over by a Republican candidate.
I seek to answer this question by answering a broader, micro-level question: Did
quality challengers emerge in those districts that experienced changes in their black
population? As Jacobson (1981) explained, incumbents who appear vulnerable attract
higher quality challengers. Many political observers feel as Bullock (1995:22) does that
“bleached” districts “ .. .attracted more formidable Republicans than would have
emerged had the racial proportions remained unchanged.” I empirically test this
proposition.
In their analysis of a majority-black district in North Carolina, Canon, Schousen
and Sellers (1994) explain that racial factors surrounding redistricting can influence
candidate emergence. The authors divide their study into several contexts that impacted
prospective candidates’ decision to run for office in North Carolina’s 1st district in 1992.
The context important to this dissertation is the structural context. The authors claim that
redistricting was the main source of uncertainty of whether the candidates would run for
office. Based on interviews with several prospective candidates, Canon et al. report that
the uncertainty of the district boundaries delayed prospective candidates’ decision to run.
All prospective candidates interviewed “ .. .said they did not begin organizing their
campaigns until after the general assembly’s approval of the first redistricting plan . . . .
(1994:34)”
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I assert that it is for this reason that the Republican Party exhibited gains in 1994
and 1996 rather than in 1992 when the districts were first drawn. Many potential
candidates, especially the higher quality candidates, were not willing to organize a
campaign when it was not certain what the district would look like.
CONCLUSION
Theories formulated in the literature on redistricting, representation, candidate
emergence, and race-based redistricting and candidate emergence have been synthesized
in an effort to develop a clearer understanding of the full impact of the 1990s
redistricting.
The importance of congressional responsiveness measured through vote behavior
has been extracted from the first body of literature. The idea that candidates, both
incumbent and non-incumbent are strategic actors, who base their decision to run for
office on several different factors, has been borrowed from the second body of literature.
Last, the proposition that the creation of majority-black districts and the Republican
takeover of Congress are possibly related to each other has been obtained from the third
body of literature.
In Chapter 3 the theories espoused in the literature discussed above will be
applied to this study in order to create a new theory of congressional roll-call voting
behavior and candidate emergence.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORY
The arguments presented in this dissertation are grounded in a broad-based
rational choice theory. The idea behind rational choice theory explained by Anthony
Downs is that the rational person “moves toward his goals in a way which, to the best of
his knowledge, uses the least possible input of scarce resources per unit of valuable
output” (1957:5). He further explains that any analysis using rational choice (or
alternatively, economic) theory must first determine what an individual’s goal or desired
end is. Second, the analysis should determine what is the most efficient method for the
individual to achieve that end. It is then expected that the individual will choose the most
efficient method because he is “rational”.
Downs’ application of rational choice theory is at the heart of this analysis.
Downs explains that a government or government officials develop policies with the
belief that the success and popularity of these policies will translate into popular votes.
He elaborates that the expected party differential “implies that each citizen casts his vote
for the party he believes will provide him with more benefits than any other” (1957:36).
For the purposes of this dissertation, each citizen casts his vote for the individual
he or she believes will provide the most benefits. Recognizing that the voter is rational in
his selection of elected officials, the individual running for office must too act rationally.
In both the roll-call voting behavior analysis as well as the candidate emergence analysis,
the desired end is electoral success in the form of reelection or election. As rational
actors the incumbent House members, candidates, and prospective candidates are
expected to behave in a way that maximizes their chance of election or reelection. In
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both instances the individual running must choose what means will most efficiently lead
to the desired end. As Downs explains, rationality refers to the means or the “processes
of action”, not to the ends.
In the roll-call voting behavior analysis the desired end is reelection. Accepting
the assertion that the primary goal of incumbent House member is reelection (Fiorina
1974; Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978), it follows that their actions while in office will be
geared toward increasing their chances of reelection. As rational actors, one of the main
methods or means employed to reach the desired end is to consider the interests of the
constituency when making policy. In other words, an incumbent House member
interested in reelection will vote in a manner that is commensurate with the ideologies
and preferences of their constituency.
In the candidate emergence analysis the desired end is election. Behaving
rationally, prospective candidates will search for the electoral atmosphere in which the
possibility of electoral victory is high.
Rational choice theory is one of the dominant paradigms in political science,
which is evidenced by the frequent application of rationality in politics. The remaining
sections will be devoted to detailing some of those works and explaining the applicability
of rational choice theory in this dissertation.
ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR
Many studies have explored the relationship between the representative and his
constituency. In particular, several studies examine constituency influence on
representatives’ decision-making (Miller and Stokes 1963; Matthews and Stimson 1970;
Fiorina 1974; Erikson 1978; McCrone and Kuklinski 1979).
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Fiorina (1974) contends that reelection is the primary goal of the House member,
and the constituency controls reelection. He explains that as a consequence,
constituents’ preferences are reflected in a representative’s voting (if at all) primarily
through his concern for his electoral survival” (1974:31). Thus, House members vote in a
way that will increase their chances of reelection.
Matthews and Stimson also comment on the purposive nature of congressional
decision making. They claim that “ . . .congressmen seek to cast their votes as rationally
as possible” (1970:16). They assert that House members recognize the benefits of casting
votes in a rational way, and also understand the costs of not behaving rationally when
casting votes. The cost in this case would be electoral defeat.
The rational behavior explained above has been explored through spatial
modeling of roll-call voting (e.g., Poole and Daniels 1985; Poole 1988; Krehbiel and
Rivers 1988; Segal et al. 1991). In the context of congressional roll-call vote behavior,
spatial modeling assumes the existence of an ideological space. Each issue is represented
by this space. The representative has an ideal point in this space based on utility
maximization. There may be several outcomes that fall under this utility function, but
again, the most important would be reelection. Thus, the representative will choose the
alternative closest to his ideal point. Application of this point for the current analysis will
be diagrammed below.
Drawing from these previous studies, and accepting the notion that the primary
goal of incumbent House members is reelection, it follows that their actions while in
office will be geared toward maximizing their chances of reelection. House members
maximize their reelection chances through constituency service, bringing federal money
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and projects to the district, and by representing their constituents’ interests in
Washington. The representation of constituents’ interests is reflected in the congruence
between the constituency interests and the House member’s policy decisions as
manifested in their roll-call voting behavior. Although each of these behaviors is
important, in this study I will focus on the last type of behavior.
After the 1990s redistricting many incumbent House members were faced with a
new district composition. House members had to decide whether they would alter their
roll-call voting behavior to reflect the changed constituency, or maintain their previous
roll-call voting behavior regardless of the new district.
Normally when new district lines are drawn, the criteria discussed in the previous
chapter are considered (e.g., conformity to local boundaries, contiguity, compactness,
etc.). In addition to those criteria, however, efforts to protect the incumbent House
member’s interest are also considered. Minimizing the change in district boundaries or
constituency composition achieves this goal. When there is no dramatic change in
district composition, policy preferences of House members remain remarkably stable
over time (Asher and Weisberg 1978).
Due to the 1990s redistricting several districts did undergo substantial changes in
boundaries and composition. What happens to voting stability after the changes occur?
Do incumbent House members change their behavior, and is this change a “stable” one?
As rational actors working toward the goal of reelection, one would expect most
incumbent House members to alter their roll-call voting behavior to reflect the changes in
their constituency (Combs et al. 1984; Glazer and Robbins 1985; Whitby and Gilliam
1991; Fleisher 1993). Most previous works on race-based redistricting find that House
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members were responsive to changes in their district composition that occurred after the
1990s redistricting (Overby and Cosgrove 1996; Lublin 1997; Sharpe and Garand
unpublished). Figure 3.1 illustrates this point. In 1991, before redistricting, on a liberal conservative scale, the constituencies’ mean ideology may be located at point A. The
incumbent House member’s ideal point, taking into consideration both his personal
ideology and the ideology of the constituency may be located at point I.
After redistricting, if a House member lost a substantial portion of his/her black
population, the median constituency preference or ideology may move to point B. It
would then be expected that the House member would modify his roll-call voting
behavior in an effort to remain representative of his constituency. In 1993/1994 the
House member may still be slightly more liberal in his ideology than his constituency,
but he has shifted in the direction that the constituency shifted (I*).
In 1995/1996, the incumbent House member maintains his position. He
recognizes however, that the ideological distance between his constituency and him,
(represented by the dotted line between point I and point B) must be smaller than the
ideological distance between a prospective candidate and the district constituency
(represented by the dotted line between point B and point C). Thus, in order to ensure
that he does not become vulnerable to a challenge, he will shift his position accordingly.
In this study I assert that the responsiveness observed among southern House
members directly after redistricting remained throughout the many court battles, which
threatened to change district composition. House members recognize that constituents
reward and punish them based on their policy views. Therefore, House members
interested in reelection will attempt to please their constituents. Thus, until the shift in
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district composition actually occurs, the House member’s roll-call voting behavior will
remain consistent with the interests of his district.
CANDIDATE EMERGENCE
Prospective challengers are profit maximizers as well. Quality challengers will
likely choose not to compete in an election that they have no chance of winning. Instead,
they will wait until the national and/or local political environment is more favorable for
their candidacy. As Kazee (1992) explains, prospective candidates must ask themselves
when is the right time to run. Timing is a contextual factor important to a potential
candidate’s decision to enter a House race.
Ambition theory, first presented by Schlesinger (1966:7-8), argues that “ ..
.potential candidates behave rationally, that is, they assess the costs and benefits of
alternative courses of action and choose the course that they perceive to be most
consistent with their political ambitions.” The theory also asserts that “ .. .politicians are
rational decision makers and do not hanker after offices they cannot hope to attain
Thus, it is not cost efficient to seek an office when the probability of winning is low or
nonexistent.
After redistricting, prospective challengers examine the new political environment
in order to see if the time is right for them to run, and if electoral success is possible. The
decision calculus associated with the notion that politicians are rational actors is:
U = (PB) - R
In this equation:
U = utility of target office O,
P = probability of winning election to Office O,
B = value of Office O,
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R = risk (e.g., cost of campaign, intrinsic value of base office, opportunity
cost of losing base office) (Jacobson and Kemell 1983:22).
The most important component of the formula for the purposes of this discussion
is the probability of winning election (P). Redistricting gives rise to several concerns that
a prospective candidate must weigh in order to determine his probability of electoral
success. This decision calculus will be applied to the current study below.
Redistricting and its results are actually one of Kazee’s (1992) contextual factors
that determine a potential candidate’s decision to run for office. Potential challengers ask
questions such as how the districts have changed in terms of partisanship and race. They
may also be concerned with what the final map will look like, and when it will be
completed. As Representative Vin Weber, R-Minn., explained in 1991, several potential
candidates told him, ‘If I don’t know what the district is going to look like, I’m not going
to run’ (Congressional Quarterly 1991:3325). In the 1990s, the potential candidates also
had to be concerned with whether a court challenge may change the existing district.
Also, the potential challenger might pay close attention to the roll-call voting
behavior of the incumbent to see whether his/her behavior has changed as a result of
constituency changes. If the incumbent’s behavior does not appear to change, the
prospective challenger may see an opportunity to defeat the incumbent.
In addition, the redrawing of congressional lines may signal a change in the
opportunity structure. In many districts, the incumbents are considered so “safe” that
their House seat is actually not considered part of the opportunity structure. However,
when district lines are redrawn, and possibly substantially altered, the incumbent may
become more vulnerable electorally.
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The idea that all of these factors would affect if and when a potential candidate
ran for congressional office is commensurate with Jacobson and Kemell’s (1983:34)
strategic politician theory. Their theory asserts that “ [politicians do act strategically.
Their career decisions are influenced by their assessment of a variable political
environment.” Thus, prospective candidates weigh the costs and benefits of running for
office at a particular time.
In this study I assert that quality challengers emerged at an increased rate in 1994
and 1996. In several of the southern states the district plans were not finalized until
shortly before the 1992 elections, making it impossible or unattractive for a candidate to
run in the election. Instead, I assert that the number of quality challengers in 1994 and
1996 was high because candidates waited until the time was right to run for election. If
this assertion were accurate, the following factors would influence quality challenger
emergence.
First of all, the more quality challengers emerged in states where race-based
redistricting occurred. With the creation of majority-black districts, several congressional
districts in a state were restructured. These restructured districts attracted more quality
challengers who hoped that shifts in district boundaries would lead to a decline in
incumbency advantage. Incumbent House members who previously relied on their name
recognition and their record of service and roll-call voting behavior are now thrust into a
“new” district. In this district the constituents may not be aware of the incumbent’s
voting record or name. Because of this, the incumbent is now electorally more
vulnerable.
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Furthermore, within these states, more quality challengers should have emerged in
districts where the incumbent did not adequately change his roll-call voting behavior to
reflect the interests of his new constituency. In districts with large changes in
constituency composition, there may have been too large of a gap between the incumbent
House members’ ideology and the ideology and policy preferences of the new
constituency. Anticipating the incumbent’s inability to accurately represent the interests
of his/her district, a quality challenger may strategically choose to run against the
incumbent. By the same token, if an incumbent House member actually does not change
his roll-call voting behavior to reflect the interests of the constituency, he too will be
challenged by an individual who recognizes this discrepancy.
Applying the decision calculus U = (PB) - R to the current study, the components
can be described as follows:
U= utility of target office - benefits associated with being a House
member (e.g., power, prestige, fame) taking into account the
probability of electoral success and the cost associated with seeking
office.
P = probability of winning election to office - probability increases in
states that underwent race-based redistricting, in districts that
experience large changes in constituency, or if incumbent was not
responsive to changes in his constituency composition.
B= value of office - benefits associated with being a House member
(e.g., power, prestige, fame).
R= risk - costs incurred by seeking office (e.g., money allocation, time
allocation, possible loss of current office).
The probability of victory (P) will be greatest in states that underwent race-based
redistricting, in districts that experienced large changes in constituency or in districts
where the incumbent was not responsive to the changes in the constituency. Accordingly
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more quality challengers will emerge when these conditions are met due to the fact that
the utility of seeking the office (U) will very likely be positive.
In this dissertation I formulate three hypotheses based on rational actor theory:
HI: Southern House members, who were responsive to changes in their district
composition directly after redistricting, remained responsive to the changes in the
constituency several years later.
House members who changed their roll-call voting behavior in 1993/1994 in
order to reflect changes in their constituency represent members acting in a manner that
increases their chance of reelection. It would be expected then that this maximizing
behavior would continue through the years as long as the desired end is reelection.
H2: In southern states where race-based redistricting occurred, quality challengers
emerged in the 1994 and 1996 congressional elections.
In order to create the majority-black district in the South, several other district
boundaries were altered. Due to district changes, both anticipated and actual, I contend
that the electoral vulnerability of incumbents in southern states that underwent race-based
redistricting increased.
H3: In southern districts where House members were not responsive to
constituency changes that occurred due to the 1990s race-based redistricting, quality
challengers emerged in the 1994 and 1996 congressional elections.
Large changes in the racial composition of a district will usually be accompanied
by changes in the ideological preference of the constituency. For instance, if a large
black voting bloc is added to a district, the expectation is that the district’s median
ideology will shift leftward. If the House member is a moderate who now finds himself
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in an overwhelmingly liberal district, he may find it impossible to accurately represent
the preferences of his constituents.
Furthermore, the advantages of incumbency are lessened when there are large
shifts in constituency. Incumbent House members who were guaranteed reelection in the
past find themselves introducing themselves to a large portion of their constituency. Both
of these factors may attract quality challengers
House members who are interested in reelection must be responsive to changes in
their constituency. If they do not make an effort to change their roll-call voting behavior
to more accurately reflect the preferences of their constituency, there is a high probability
that they will be met with a high quality challenger in southern districts where there were
large changes in racial composition of districts due to the 1990s race-based redistricting,
quality challengers emerged in the 1994 and 1996 congressional elections.
CONCLUSION
Incumbent House members as well as prospective House candidates are rational
actors whose goal is electoral success. Both incumbent members and prospective
candidates select the method or means that will yield them the largest probability of
success. The most efficient method for incumbent House members is to vote the
preferences of their constituency. The most efficient method for prospective House
candidates is to choose elections where the conditions are favorable for electoral victory.
These profit maximizing decisions were made in the context of the 1990s
redistricting. Rational House members who lost substantial portions of their black
constituency due to redistricting should have become more conservative in their roll-call

47

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

voting behavior. Strategic politicians deciding whether to run for the House also
considered the redistricting induced constituency changes in their decision calculus.
In the next chapter an explanation of the data and methods used to test the
theories described above will be presented. As illustrated in this chapter, the dissertation
is divided into two major groups of analyses. The first group focusing on roll-call voting
behavior and the second group focusing on candidate emergence. An extensive
discussion of each type of analysis is included in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND METHODS
There has been much discussion over the role that race-based redistricting in the
1990s played on the increased conservatism in the House. I contend that there is a direct
relationship and an indirect relationship between the creation of majority-black districts
and increased conservatism in the House. The direct relationship focuses on the vote
behavior of the House member. The change in black population in a district leads to
change in roll-call vote behavior. The indirect relationship focuses on the partisan
makeup of the House. Some political observers believe that the creation of these districts
influenced that shift in party control by making the districts that lost portions of their
black population more attractive to prospective Republican challengers.
With this in mind I study the impact of race-based redistricting on roll-call voting
behavior as well as partisan makeup in the House. In the roll-call voting behavior portion
of the analysis I examine whether the responsiveness witnessed directly after redistricting
carried through several years after redistricting. In the candidate emergence portion of
the analysis, I examine whether more quality challengers emerged in states and districts
affected by race-based redistricting. A description of each analysis and the variables used
follows. But first it is important to explain why I focus exclusively on majority-black
districts.
In addition to an increase in black districts, the 1990s redistricting also resulted in
the creation of eight new majority-Hispanic districts. Yet, I make a distinction between
the representation of blacks versus Hispanics because of the unique history that has
existed between black and white Americans in the United States. Black and white
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Americans continue in some respects to have an antagonistic relationship that stems from
a history of separation and discrimination. Thus, although it is a fact that many ethnic
and racial minorities in the U.S. experience discrimination, the relationship between
white and black Americans is distinct because of its history.
The antagonistic relationship manifests itself in many aspects of representational
politics in the U.S. First of all, black candidates find it nearly impossible to win election
in majority-white districts. In fact, in U.S. history only nine blacks have been elected to
serve in majority-white districts. This is largely due to a phenomenon confirmed in
Terkildsen’s 1993 study. She found that racial prejudice drives white voters’ evaluation
of a candidate. White voters are more likely to prefer a white candidate to a black
candidate with identical background and qualifications. This phenomenon is not unique
to whites voters. With the 1990 retirement of Democrat Lindy Boggs of Louisiana, there
are no majority-black districts represented by a white House member.
Second, Grofman and Handley (1991) find that, even after the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, there has not been a change in race-conscious roll-call voting behavior among
whites. The authors claim the only reason for an increase in black legislators elected in
the southern states is due to enforcement of the VRA and the creation of majority-black
districts.
Third, research has shown that some white House members feel threatened by
large black populations. In districts with large black populations, it is expected that
responsive House members will reflect the size of the population through their roll-call
voting behavior. In some instances this does not occur. Instead of voting in accordance
with black interests, as expected, House members will vote against black interests. Giles
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(1977) refers to this phenomenon as the hostility hypothesis. Researchers who have
hypothesized this relationship claim that as the relative size of the black population in an
area increases, up to 50%, whites perceive a greater threat from blacks. This perception
of threat increases the probability that whites will act against the interests of blacks.
In addition to the above stated reasons for focusing on majority-black districts,
there is a technical reason as well. There is an entire body of research that focuses on the
representational relationship between black and white Americans (Whitby, 1987; Fossett
and Kiecolt, 1989; Grofman and Handley, 1989; Welch, 1990; Whitby and Gilliam,
1991; Grofman, Handley, and Niemi, 1992; Swain, 1993, Tate, 1993; Terkildsen, 1993).
This dissertation therefore, is grounded in previous political science research that has
contemplated the representational relationship between black and white Americans.
ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
A major portion of this analysis focuses on the actions of individual House
members. More specifically, one of the major functions of a member of Congress is
policy-making. Roll-call votes are recorded for all House members voting on a particular
piece of legislative action. These votes are scrutinized in an effort to understand, explain,
and predict House members’ roll-call voting behavior.
Interest Group Scores
Interest groups select several key votes on issues that concern the group and then
rate the House member based on these votes. Much of the research done on this general
area of study uses interest group scores as a measure of House members’ roll-call voting
behavior in an attempt to ascertain how supportive of the liberal or conservative position
a House member is. Other researchers use interest group scores that measure how
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supportive a House member is to civil rights issues, or “black issues”. However, there is
no consensus on which is the best measurement of ideology, or support for the interests
of blacks.1
Scores given by liberal and conservative interest groups are often times criticized
for being unreliable, inconsistent, and biased (Keller, 1982:1607-1609). First, the method
for selecting which votes will be used to rate House members is subjective. For instance
the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) have a committee of ADA activists who
select approximately 20 of the most important votes during the session. This list is then
passed on to the ADA’s national board for approval. Thus, there is no scientific method
used to determine vote selection.
Second, most interest groups only select a small percentage, or sample, of
hundreds of roll-call votes cast. Therefore, interest group scores have been characterized
as a limited indicator of congressional vote behavior rather than a thorough and complete
indicator. Some argue that by selecting some votes and excluding others, interest groups
bias their ratings toward extreme ideological positions. This bias is evidenced in the
distribution of House members’ interest group scores. James Snyder (1992) examines
this phenomenon. He finds that the distribution of interest group scores is bimodal, with
most House member in a given year being either extremely liberal or extremely
conservative. More of a normal curve distribution would be expected, recognizing that
House members’ roll-call voting behavior on average is more moderate.

1 W hitby (1997) uses Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) scores, Bullock, 1995 uses LCCR
and Conservative Coalition (CC) scores, Overby and Cosgrove (1996) use Committee on Political
Education (COPE) scores, and Sharpe and Garand (1994, unpublished) use Americans for Democratic
A ction (ADA) scores.
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Third, some interest groups have been inconsistent when choosing which votes to
include in their rating. For example, The American Conservative Union (ACU)
consistently counted a vote to raise the federal debt ceiling as a negative towards a House
member. However, when President Reagan supported an increase in the debt ceiling,
ACU simply stopped including that issue in its scoring (Keller, 1982:1608).
In essence, the meaning of conservatism may have changed throughout history.
Roll-call voting behavior ratings compiled by the Committee on Political
Education (COPE) and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) seem more
appropriate for the current study that focuses on legislative issues important to blacks.
However, the use of COPE ratings may be problematic because of its interest in foreign
policy and other issues that do not uniquely affect African-Americans.
The use of LCCR scores has been criticized in this type of study because the
LCCR also focuses on many issues that are not salient to blacks; hence, the rating may be
a misrepresentation of a House member’s position on black issues. Also, the LCCR
scores are reported biennially rather than annually. This makes it difficult for scholars
researching current vote behavior in Congress to use the LCCR scores.
Despite the insufficiencies of the interest group scores, they are the most
commonly used method of gathering information on congressional roll-call behavior.
Therefore, for purposes of comparability, models using ADA scores are included in the
study. However, taking into consideration the criticisms of these methods, I have chosen
to concentrate on a different method for obtaining patterns of House members’ roll-call
voting behavior.
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Poole and Rosenthal Scores
Poole and Rosenthal (1991) use a spatial model to capture House members’ rollcall voting patterns. In their model they include every recorded roll-call vote between
1789 -1996. For the purposes of this study I focus on the years from 1991 -1996. The
point to be emphasized is that their estimation includes all roll-call votes, except for those
with less than 2.5% minority support. They also include every member of Congress who
cast at least 25 votes during a two-year period. This is in contrast to most interest groups,
which focus on ten - twenty votes.
The authors’ spatial model includes two dimensions, both of which capture House
members’ political positions. The first dimension ranges from strong loyalty toward one
party (Democrat) to weak loyalty to either party to strong loyalty to the second,
competing party (Republican). The first dimension accounts for almost the entire
variance in vote behavior. Eighty percent of the behavior is captured in the first
dimension, while only three percent is captured in the second dimension (Poole and
Rosenthal, 1991:235).
The second dimension focuses on ideological loyalty. It ranges from liberal to
conservative within the two parties. This dimension is really only necessary when the
party system is in upheaval. The authors give two examples of when the second
dimension would increase the explanatory power of the model. The first period of
instability was from 1815 to 1825 after the disintegration of the Federalist Party. The
second period of instability was in the 1850s when Whig Party collapsed and tension over
slavery grew. Poole and Rosenthal assert that:
The distinction between the two dimensions is a fine one. Loyalty to a political
party and loyalty to an ideology have a similar behavioral implication of
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consistent, stable voting patterns. This is the reason that —especially during
periods of stability—a one dimensional model accounts for most voting in
Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991:230).
Taking into account the previous discussion, the Poole and Rosenthal scores from
the first dimension will be used in Chapters 5 and 6 as an indicator of liberalism
according to his/her roll-call voting behavior. This measure will be used as a proxy for
House members’ support of issues that are more likely supported by African-Americans.
As mentioned earlier, Tate (1993) finds that blacks as a group remain overwhelmingly
liberal. The exhaustive technique used by Poole and Rosenthal is superior to the other
rating methods. Although it does not focus on issues specific to African-Americans, it
also does not limit its scope by selecting votes that may or may not be salient to AfricanAmericans.
The Poole and Rosenthal scoring system presents a comprehensive measure of
ideology that will better help us to understand fluctuations in House members’ roll-call
voting behavior.
RESEARCH DESIGN FOR ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
In Chapter 5 I examine the roll-call voting behavior of members of the United
States House of Representatives who served from as far back as 1991 (before
redistricting), until 1996.
Both the Poole and Rosenthal scores and the ADA scores are presented in this
dissertation. ADA scores are tabulated yearly. The years of interest are 1993 and 1996.
Poole and Rosenthal scores on the other hand, are based on congressional terms. This
study focuses on the 103rd Congress and the 104th Congress. House members included in
the 103rd Congress were elected in 1992, and served from 1993 through 1994. House
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members included in the 104th Congress were elected in 1994 and served from 1995
through 1996.
These scores are used to obtain the liberal or conservative leanings of the House
members. These scores, which capture roll-call vote behavior, serve as the dependent
variable in this analysis. In their original form, Poole and Rosenthal scores range from 1, which is the highest liberal voting score, to 1, which is the highest conservative voting
score. In this study I have rescaled the Poole and Rosenthal scores to be consistent with
ADA scores which have been used in several previous studies on roll-call voting
behavior. Consequently, in this study the Poole and Rosenthal scores range from -1,
which is the highest conservative voting score, to 1, which is the highest liberal voting
score. The ADA scores range from 0 to 100, with 0 representing the most conservative
position and 100 representing the most liberal position.
In order to uncover whether congressional responsiveness observed after initial
redistricting, marked a permanent change, I compare changes in House members’ rollcall voting behavior from 1991 to 1996 to the changes observed from 1991 to 1994.
The independent variables that are most important to this analysis are those that
deal with the black population of the district. This is the relationship in which I am most
interested. What effect does the black population proportion, and more importantly, the
changes in black population have on the roll-call voting behavior of House members?
Also, what if any change in the impact of black population can be observed in the last
two to three years.
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Baseline model
I develop an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to determine to what
extent changes in black population proportions between 1991 and 1996 have affected the
roll-call behavior of House members. I first replicate a model developed by Sharpe and
Garand (1994, unpublished) that estimates legislative responsiveness for 1994. I estimate
this model using both the ADA and Poole and Rosenthal scores. In this chapter however,
I will construct the models using Poole and Rosenthal scores. As the point of departure I
first test the following model:
Poole and Rosenthal 1993/1994 = a + bl (Poole and Rosenthal 1991/1992) + b2
(Party) + b3 (South) + b4 (Seniority) + b5 (Change in Democratic
Presidential Vote between 1988 and 1992) + b6 (Change in Black
Population Proportion Due to Redistricting) + b7 (Black
Population Proportion Post-Redistricting)
This model will explain what effect the change in black population had on a
House member’s roll-call voting behavior in 1993/1994. A complete description of the
variables can be found in Table 4.1. The results from this equation will then be used to
compare congressional responsiveness in 1993/1994 to responsiveness in 1995/1996.
The above model can be replicated for 1995/1996:
Poole and Rosenthal 1995/1996 = a + bl (Poole and Rosenthal 1993/1994) + b2
(Party) + b3 (South) +b4 (Seniority) + b5 (Change in Democratic
Presidential Vote between 1992 and 1996) + b6 (Change in Black
Population Proportion Due to Redistricting) + b7 (Black
Population Proportion Post-Redistricting)
The dependent variable is Poole and Rosenthal 1995/1996, which is based on the
Poole and Rosenthal scores. These roll-call vote scores are obtained for all House
members who served at least as far back as 1991 up to the 1996 congressional election. I
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have also included several independent variables in this model that help to explain the
roll-call vote in 1995/1996.
First, I include Poole and Rosenthal 1993/1994, which is a lagged roll-call score.
This variable is included because House members’ roll-call voting behavior has been
found to be relatively consistent over time (Asher and Weisberg, 1978). Thus, I expect
that House members’ roll-call behavior in 1995/1996 will be a function of their previous
roll-call behavior.
Second, Party is a dummy variable coded 1 for Democratic House members and 0
for Republicans. Historically, Republicans vote more conservatively, while Democrats’
roll-call voting behavior tends to be more liberal. The expected relationship between the
two variables is positive. The more democratic a House member, the higher the Poole
and Rosenthal roll-call score.
Third, I include a South variable that takes into account the fact that Southern
House members are relatively more conservative than their non-Southern counterparts
(Rohde, 1991).2 This is measured as a dummy variable, coded 1 for representatives from
southern states and 0 otherwise. The coefficient for this variable should be negative.
The southern House members are more conservative in their roll-call voting behavior,
giving them a negative Poole and Rosenthal roll-call vote score.
Fourth, I include a Seniority variable to capture possible generational differences
in roll-call voting behavior. There have been conflicting findings over this variable’s
effect on roll-call voting behavior. Some scholars have observed a relationship between

2 This variable refers to the 11 states of the Confederacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
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seniority and support for public sector growth (Payne, 1991; Moore and Hibbing, 1995).
In their 1994 study, Sharpe and Garand find no discernible effect between seniority and
congressional liberalism. Thus, I include the Seniority variable in the analysis to clarify
its impact.
Fifth, Change in Democratic Presidential Vote between 1992 and 1996 refers to
the change in the partisan composition of the district. This variable is measured by
comparing the Democratic presidential vote proportion in 1992 with the proportion in
1996. I expect a positive relationship. As the Democratic vote in the district increases,
roll-call liberalism should increase.
Sixth, Change in Black Population Proportion Due to Redistricting reflects any
changes in black population experienced in a district during the 1990s redistricting. I
expect House members to exhibit more liberal roll-call voting behavior as the black
population increases in their district.
Seventh, I also include a variable, Black Population Proportion Post-Redistricting,
in order to explore whether House members are responsive to the interests of their black
population in 1996. This is an important variable due to previous findings by Sharpe and
Garand (1994, unpublished), who find that House members are responsive to the change*?
in black population in their district, but not very responsive to the level of the black
population in their district.
Although this variable does not seem to have an effect on the dependent variable
in the previous study, I consider the timing on this study a significant factor that may
impact the results. Concerns with changes in black population may have overshadowed
concerns
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Table 4.1: Roll-Call Voting Behavior Variables
Variable
Poole and Rosenthal 1993/1994

Description
House members’ Poole and Rosenthal score
based on 1993/1994 roll-call voting record.
Variable amount ranges from -1 to 1.
Poole and Rosenthal 1991/1992
House members’ Poole and Rosenthal score
based on 1991/1992 roll-call voting records.
ADA scores 1993
House members’ Americans for Democratic
Action Score based on members’ 1993 roll-call
voting behavior. Variable ranges from 0-100.
Average ADA 1991/1992
House members’ average ADA score for 1991
and 1992 based on members’ roll-call voting
behavior in those years.
Party
1 = Democratic House member; 0 =
Republican House member.
South
1 = 11 southern states 0 = all other states
Seniority
The number of consecutive years a member
has served in the House up until the year of
interest-1993/1994 or 1995/1996.
Change in Democratic Presidential Vote Change in proportion of presidential vote for
between 1988 and 1992
the Democratic presidential candidate in 1988
and 1992 using the 1992 geographic district for
both years.
Change in Black Population Proportion Actual change in black population as a
Due to Redistricting
proportion of the congressional district’s total
population before and after redistricting.
Black
Population
Proportion
Post- Actual black population as a proportion of the
Redistricting
congressional districts’ total population after
1990s redistricting.
Roll-Call Vote in 1995/1996
House members’ Poole and Rosenthal score
based on 1995/1996 roll-call voting record.
Variable amount ranges from -1 to 1.
Change in Democratic Presidential Vote Change in actual district level vote for
between 1992 and 1996
Democratic presidential candidate in 1992 and
1996.
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with the actual levels of black population. With reelection as their primary goal, I expect
House members to be responsive to the level of black population in their districts.
CANDIDATE EMERGENCE ANALYSIS
This analysis focuses on the emergence of quality challengers in states that
underwent race-based redistricting, districts with large racial population shifts, and
districts where the incumbent did not exhibit a change in roll-call voting behavior to
reflect population changes.
As mentioned earlier, researchers concentrate on both local and national factors to
explain the emergence of quality challengers. In his study focusing on the strategic
politician thesis, Jacobson (1989) uses two variables to measure local conditions. The
first variable is the percentage of votes won by the candidate of the challenger's party in
the last election. The second variable is whether the seat switched party hands in the last
election. Jacobson uses the economy and presidential approval to measure national
conditions. He finds that both local and national conditions affect whether the
Democratic challenger is a high quality challenger. On the other hand only the local
forces seem to affect the probability of the Republican challenger being considered a
quality challenger.
I suspect that this trend has changed in the 1990s, with the change in political
climate that has taken place. The 1992 election marked the first election in 12 years that
a Democrat won the presidency. This should change the impact of national forces such
as presidential popularity, presidential coattails and midterm effects. In particular,
midterm elections are often considered a referendum on the president’s performance
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(Tufte, 1975; Campbell, 1985; Campbell 1991). Invariably, the president’s party loses
congressional seats during the midterm election. When Republicans dominated the
presidency, the Democrats benefited from this midterm effect. Now that a Democrat has
occupied the presidency, the national forces thought only to influence Democrats in the
past now also influence prospective Republican challengers.
Jacobson and Kemell’s (1983) research has generated a lively scholarly
discussion of challenger quality and how it should be measured (Bond, Covington and
Fleisher, 1985; Abramowitz, 1988; Krasno and Green, 1988; Stewart, 1989; Squire 1989;
Lublin, 1994). Jacobson and Kemell simply measure challenger quality by whether a
candidate has ever held elective office. Those challengers who have held elective office
are classified as quality challengers, whereas those challengers who have not held
elective office are not considered quality challengers.
Jacobson and Kemell’s measure is somewhat crude. There may be gradations of
challenger quality that are not captured in a measure that only distinguishes between
those who have held elective positions versus those who have not. Because of this, many
scholars have attempted to refine Jacobson and Kernell’s measure of challenger quality.
Perhaps the most extreme attempt at improving the measure is offered by Krasno
and Green. The authors divide challengers into those whom previously held office and
those who did not, giving a value of four for candidates who have held office and zero for
those who have not. They then assign additional points for each criterion that a candidate
meets within their grouping. Group one is for challengers who have held political office
and it includes (1) Type of office; (2) Currently in office; (3) Previous congressional run
and (4) Celebrity status. Group two is for challengers who have not held political office
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and it includes: (1) Previous candidate for political office; (2) Previous congressional run;
(3) Non-elective office; (4) Type of non-elective office; (5) Political activist/party
connections/political aide; (6) Professional status and (7) Celebrity status. Each
challenger adds a point to his base score of four or zero, for each criterion that apply to
his experiences. The authors admit that this is a rather arbitrary way to measure
challenger quality.
Jacobson and Kemell (1990) changed their measure of challenger quality,
focusing on campaign spending instead of previous experience. But as Squire (1996:894)
explains,

.. using money raised as a measure of candidate quality confuses potential

ability with the result.” Using challenger spending as a measure of challenger quality
leads to a circular argument. The higher the quality of the challenger, the more money he
or she can raise, and the more money a challenger raises the more quality that challenger
appears.
Recognizing the fallibility in the scholarly efforts to devise a more accurate
method of measuring challenger quality, Lublin (1994) has created a measure that can be
justified on empirical grounds. In a study examining the U.S. Senate, Lublin offers a
measure of challenger quality that ranks the impact of holding one type of political office
versus another. Thus, there are levels of challenger quality based on an ordinal scale
depicting different types of political service.
I adopt this basic concept, and construct a hierarchical scale for House members.
Following the lead of previous studies, I do not include challenger spending in my
explanation of challenger quality due to the circularity of the measure (Bond, Covington,
and Fleisher, 1985; Krasno and Green, 1989; Squire, 1989; Lublin, 1994). This data will
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be used in Chapter 6 to answer the question: what influenced challenger quality in the
1994 and 1996 elections?
RESEARCH DESIGN FOR CANDIDATE EMERGENCE ANALYSIS
In Chapter 6 , 1 analyze U.S. House of Representatives elections in 1994 and 1996.
I assert that quality challengers emerged at an increased rate in 1994 and 1996 in states
and districts affected by race-based redistricting. In several of the southern states the
district plans were not finalized until shortly before the 1992 elections, making it
impossible or unattractive for a candidate to run in the election. Instead, I assert that the
number of quality challengers in 1994 and 1996 was higher than in 1992 because
candidates waited until the time was right to run for election. If this assertion were
accurate, the following factors would influence quality challenger emergence. I assert
that more quality challengers emerged in 1994 and 1996: (1) in states that underwent
race-based redistricting; and (2) in districts where incumbents were not responsive to
changes in the racial composition of their district.
In order to predict challenger quality, I first construct a model that predicts
incumbent vote. The results of this model are used to devise a hierarchical scale of
challenger quality; this scale then becomes the dependent variable in Model 2.
Model 1
The dependent variable is the vote for the incumbent and is measured as the
margin of victory between the incumbent and the challenger.
The independent variables that are of greatest importance in this model are the
variables which focus on which offices a challenger has previously held. Those
independent variables are state legislator, lesser statewide office, and local official. The
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coefficients for these three types of office are used to make a scale of the relative
importance of different types of political experience. I develop an OLS regression model
to test the relationship, controlling for other independent variables, which are related to
the incumbent’s margin of victory:
Incumbent Margin of Victory = a + b l (State Legislative Experience) + b2 (Other
Statewide Office Experience) + b3 (Local Office Experience) + b4
(Incumbent’s Margin of Victory in Previous Election) + b5
(District Level Presidential Vote) + b6 (Member of President’s
Party)
The dependent variable is Incumbent Margin of Victory. I specify this model for
1992 and 1994 elections. I regress the dependent variable on several independent
variables.
The first three independent variables focus on whether the House challenger held
elective office prior to his/her run for House election, and if so, did their office fall under
State Legislative Experience, Other Statewide Office Experience, or Local Office
Experience. Each of these is a dummy variable coded 1 if the challengers’ previous
office fit into the specific category and 0 if it did not. The relationship between these
variables and the dependent variable should be a negative one. As the quality of the
challenger increases, the margin of victory for the incumbent decreases.
Incumbent’s Margin of Victory in Previous Election takes into account how
popular the incumbent was in the last election. Those incumbents who won by large
margins in the previous elections will very likely win by large margins in the next
election.
District Level Presidential Vote refers to the percentage of district votes the
president received in the previous presidential election. In order to account for partisan
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differences, this variable is multiplied by -1 if the incumbent is a Republican and 1 if the
incumbent is a Democrat. During the years analyzed in this study the president is a
Democrat. Therefore, the coefficient for this variable should be positive. The higher the
presidential vote the higher the Democratic incumbent vote.
Member of President’s Party distinguishes whether the incumbent House member
is of the same party of the president or not. This variable is coded 1 if the House member
and the president identify with the same party, and 0 if they do not. I expect a positive
relationship between this variable and the dependent variable during presidential election
years.
I expect an opposite effect during 1994 due to the fact that it is a midterm election
year. Vast research has been carried out confirming the negative effect of midterm
elections on the incumbent of the same party of the president (Tufte 1978; Kemell 1977;
Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984; Campbell 1993). These studies confirm that the president’s
party always loses congressional seats in the midterm because voters use the midterm
basically as a referendum on the president’s performance. Therefore, expectations of the
relationship vary depending on what year is being analyzed.
Model 2

I will utilize the coefficients obtained from Model 1 to form a hierarchical scale of
challenger quality. This hierarchical scale then becomes the dependent variable in the
subsequent analysis.
There are also several independent variables that determine whether a quality
challenger emerged in the 1994 and 1996 congressional elections. I use an ordered logit
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regression model to test the relationship between challenger quality and several
independent variables:
Challenger Quality = a + bl (Incumbent’s Margin of Victory in Previous
Election) + b2 (District Level Presidential Vote) + b3 (Member of
President’s Party) + b4 (Race-Based Redistricted State) +
b5 (Responsiveness to Racial Changes in the Constituency Due to
Redistricting)
The dependent variable is challenger quality, which is based on whether a
challenger held previous political office. The variable is an ordinal scale including no
experience, state legislator, lesser statewide office, and local official. This model is also
specified for 1994 and 1996.
Incumbent’s Margin of Victory in Previous Election is used to measure what
effect the local environment may have on whether a quality challenger emerges. If the
incumbent won by a large margin in the previous election, the more quality challenger
may opt not to enter that particular House race. Thus, there should be a negative
relationship. The higher the previous incumbent’s vote, the lower the level of challenger
quality.
The second independent variable is the District Level Presidential Vote. As in
Model 1, presidential vote is based on the percentage of the district vote the president
received in the most recent election. Again this variable will be multiplied by 1 if the
incumbent House member is a Democrat, and -1 if the incumbent House member is a
Republican. I expect a negative relationship (i.e., the higher the presidential vote, the
lower the level of challenger quality when the incumbent is a Democrat).
Member of President’s Party captures information on whether the House
incumbent is a member of the same party as the president. If the incumbent is of the
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president’s party in 1996, this will have a negative impact on the dependent variable.
However, if the incumbent is of the president’s party during the 1994, midterm election,
the coefficient will be positive. Incumbents who share a party label with the president
during midterm will be more likely to attract higher quality challengers.
Race-Based Redistricted State represents whether a state underwent race-based
redistricting in the 1990s. If a state experienced race-based redistricting, the possibility
that high quality challengers will emerge increases. Only eight of the eleven southern
states of the Confederacy experienced race-based redistricting. These states are
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and
Virginia. This variable’s coefficient should be positive. In states that underwent racebased redistricting, more quality challengers emerged in 1994 and 1996 due to the
increased electoral opportunity that the boundary shifts initiated.
Challenger Party indicates what political party the challenger identifies with. The
expectation is that the higher quality challengers in 1994 and 1996 identify to a greater
extent, with the Republican party. I expect this relationship to be accentuated in the
Southern states where race-based redistricting very likely made incumbent Democratic
House members more vulnerable.
The Responsiveness to Racial Changes in the Constituency Due to Redistricting
variable accounts for any ideological discrepancies between expected and actual roll-call
voting behavior changes as a result of shifts in the racial composition of districts. In
order to construct this variable, I construct a model of roll-call voting in 1993/1994 using
Poole and Rosenthal scores. This equation yields predicted Poole and Rosenthal scores
for 1993/1994. I then subtract the actual Poole and Rosenthal scores in 1995/1996 from
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Table 4.2: Candidate Emergence Variables
Variable
Incumbent Margin of Victory
State Legislative Experience, Other
Statewide Office Experience, Local Office
Experience
Incumbent’s Margin of Victory in Previous
Election
District Level Presidential Vote

Member of President’s Party

Challenger Quality

Race-Based Redistricted State
Challenger Party
Responsiveness to Racial Changes in the
Constituency Due to Redistricting

Description
Actual proportion of district vote by which
incumbent defeated the challenger.
Previous political experience. Each of these is
a dummy variable coded 1 if the challenger
held the office prior to running for Congress
and 0 if he did not.
Actual proportion of district vote by which the
incumbent defeated the challenger in last
election.
Actual proportion of district vote the president
received in last election. This variable is
multiplied by -1 if the incumbent is a
Republican and 1 if the incumbent is a
Democrat.
1 = House members who share same party
with president; 0 = House members who do
not share the same party with the president.
Ordinal scale including no political experience,
state legislative experience, statewide office
experience, and local office experience.
1 = states that underwent race-based
redistricting in the 1990s; 0 = all other states.
1 = Democratic challenger; -1 = Republican
challenger
Discrepancy between predicted roll-call
behavior based on replication of Glazer and
Robbins’ model and actual roll-call behavior
of incumbent House member.
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the predicted Poole and Rosenthal scores in 1993/1994. The outcome of this equation
becomes the predicted change in Poole and Rosenthal scores. I then subtract the actual
Poole and Rosenthal scores in 1995/1996 from the actual Poole and Rosenthal scores in
1993/1994. The outcome of this equation becomes the actual change in Poole and
Rosenthal scores. The last step is to subtract the actual change in Poole and Rosenthal
scores from the predicted change in Poole and Rosenthal scores in order to obtain the
Responsiveness to Racial Changes in the Constituency Due to Redistricting variable.
I expect a positive relationship. The higher this value, or the larger the difference
between expected Poole and Rosenthal scores and actual Poole and Rosenthal scores
based on changes in the black population the less responsive the incumbent House
member. The less responsive the incumbent House member, the more likely that House
member will attract quality challengers.
Model 3

A third model is constructed that deviates slightly from the above model. In this
model I include a variable identifying the party affiliation of the challenger. It is
important to know which one of the two parties fielded the stronger candidates in 1994
and 1996, and whether this relationship was stronger in the South or the non-South. The
variable measuring whether the incumbent is a member of the same party of the president
is excluded from this model due to the fact that these two variables are highly correlated.
CONCLUSION
There are delayed and ongoing effects of the 1990s race-based redistricting. It is
important to compare the effects directly after redistricting with the effects several years
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after redistricting. The models described in the roll-call voting behavior portion of this
chapter focus on the ongoing effects of the redistricting.
Equally important is the impact that the creation of majority-black districts had on
candidate emergence. In particular, the models described in this chapter seek to explain
what factors influenced the decision of quality challengers to run for election in 1994 and
1996.
A complete explanation of the models constructed in this chapter will be
presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
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CHAPTER 5
ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR
In most of the studies on race-based redistricting carried out in the early 1990s,
scholars found House members to be responsive to the racial composition changes in
their districts due to redistricting. With the benefit of time we can now evaluate whether
those changes in roll-call vote behavior were short term or long term changes. In this
chapter I construct a model of legislative responsiveness using the Poole and Rosenthal
scores for 1993/1994 and 1995/1996 as the dependent variable; a similar set of models is
estimated using ADA scores from 1993 and 1996. It is necessary to first obtain the
results from the 1993/1994 regression model in order to compare responsiveness directly
after redistricting with responsiveness several years after redistricting. In addition, I
estimate two models for each year analyzed. I estimate separate models for all House
members and for all white House members (i.e., excluding black and Hispanic members).
It is important to disaggregate the effects that redistricting has had on white members
versus all members. Presumably, white House members experienced a notable loss in
their black population at a higher rate than non-white House members. It would not be
surprising to observe different reactions to the racial changes in constituency between
white and non-white House members.
Models using both the Poole and Rosenthal scores and the ADA scores are
presented in this chapter because the scores measure different phenomenon. As
explained earlier, Poole and Rosenthal scores include basically all roll-call votes with the
criteria for excluding a vote being based on lack of opposition (i.e., 2.5% or less minority
support). Conversely, ADA scores are based on approximately twenty votes that an
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ADA committee deems to be most important to the organization’s political objectives.
So while Poole and Rosenthal scores give us a comprehensive measure of ideology based
on roll-call voting behavior, ADA scores might be depicted as based on the more
ideologically divisive votes in which a clear liberal or conservative position is
represented (Snyder 1992). The difference in what these scores measure is evidenced in
the results presented in this chapter, and will be explained at length.
POOLE AND ROSENTHAL ANALYSIS
Before discussing the multivariate models, it is important to mention some
noteworthy descriptive results. Due to the 1990s redistricting, 23 districts represented by
white House members experienced a drop in black population ranging from 10% to 28%.
Only three districts represented by white members experienced an increase in black
population ranging from 10% to 22%. Also important to note is that, before the 1990s
redistricting, 28 districts represented by white members had black populations ranging
from 30% to 72%. After redistricting, only nine districts represented by white members
had black populations ranging from 30% to 52%. This data confirms the fact that several
white districts did lose portions of their black population due to redistricting. The
multivariate analysis will expose some of the unintended effects of the race-based
redistricting.
Also, interesting to note is the shift in roll-call voting behavior that occurred
between 1991/1992 and 1995/1996. For all members the Poole and Rosenthal scores
shifted from 0.09597 in 1991/1992, to -0.1336 in 1995/1996. Thus, House members have
become more conservative in general throughout the 1990s. Figures 5.1 through 5.3
illustrate the shift in roll-call voting behavior among white members. The same shift
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FIGURE 5.1: POOLE AND ROSENTHAL 1991/1992
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FIGURE 5.2: POOLE AND ROSENTHAL 1993/1994
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FIGURE 5.3: POOLE AND ROSENTHAL 1995/1996
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occurred in the all member model, but the shift that occurred among white members is
more pronounced. In 1991/1992 the average Poole and Rosenthal score for white House
members was 0.05. By 1995/1996, the average score is -0.23. This signifies a large shift
to more conservative roll-call voting behavior. It is possible that this shift is associated
with the race-based redistricting that took effect between the years mentioned above.
However, it is important to keep in mind that this shift is observed in an analysis
including all House members who were in office between 1991 and 1996.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Regression Estimates for Poole and Rosenthal 1993/1994
The regression estimates for the 1993/1994 Poole and Rosenthal model are
presented in Table 5.1. Model 5.1 (a) includes House members who served in Congress
from 1991 through 1994 (N=304). Model 5.1 (b) includes only white House members
(N= 277), who served in Congress from 1991 through 1994. Both of these models have
an adjusted R2of 0.98, proving to be a superlative fit to the data.
Keep in mind that the Poole and Rosenthal scores have been rescaled so that a —1,
represents the most conservative voting record and a 1 represents the most liberal voting
record. In general the findings are consistent with those of previous studies.
First of all, in the all members model as well as the white members only model,
House members’ roll-call voting behavior in 1993/1994 is largely influenced by their
previous roll-call voting behavior. This effect is captured by the coefficients for a lagged
Poole and Rosenthal score variable for 1991/992. This finding confirms the idea that
House members’ roll-call voting behavior is consistent over time.
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Table 5.1: Parameter Values for Models of District Level Effects of Black Population Change on House Member's Voting Behavior
Using Poole and Rosenthal 93/94 Scores

All House Members

While House Members Only

(la)
b

(lb)
t

b

l

Intercept

0.036

4.564***

0.033

3.935***

Poole and Rosenthal 91/92

0.980

47.180***

0.983

45.238***

Party

0.001

0.152

0.002

0.152

South

0.010

0.997

0.010

0.920

Seniority

0.001

1.143

0.001

1.297

Change in DEM Population

0.000

0.326

0.000

0.708

Change in Black Population

0.002

2.059**

0.002

1.711**

Black Population Post Rcdist

0.000

0.025

0.000

0.453

Adjusted R2
N

* ** sig n ifican t at .01 level, one-tailed test
* * significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

0.980
304

0.979
277

Second, the coefficient for the party variable does not attain statistical
significance in either model. This finding is surprising because this may suggest that
levels of liberalism and conservatism in 1993/1994 were not related to partisan
identification. A more feasible explanation is that the effects of party are captured in the
lagged Poole and Rosenthal variable. As explained in Chapter 4, the Poole and Rosenthal
scores used in this study measure House member’s level of liberalism evidenced by their
roll-call voting behavior.
Third, the results suggest that House members from southern states do not vote
more liberally or conservatively than House members from other regions of the country.
The coefficient for this variable carries an unexpected positive sign, and is not
statistically significant in either model.
Fourth, seniority does not appear to have an effect on House members’ roll-call
voting behavior. Due to the disagreement over the direction of impact seniority should
have on roll-call voting behavior, only a two-tailed test would be appropriate in
determining statistical significance. In Model 5.1 (a) as well as Model 5.1 (b), this
variable fails to attain significance.
Fifth, roll-call vote behavior does not seem to be affected by changes in the
partisan composition of the district that were brought on by decennial redistricting. This
is counter to previous research findings that show partisan composition changes to have
an significant effect on roll-call voting behavior (Glazer and Robbins 1985). This finding
lends support to the possibility that partisan composition changes were overshadowed by
racial composition changes. Blacks constitute a large Democratic voting bloc, so there is
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definitely overlap between the two variables. However, the effects of race prevail over
party.
At the center of the analysis are the variables measuring district level changes in
black population pre- and post-redistricting, as well as black population post-redistricting.
These variables become increasingly important as they are compared with 1995/1996
regression results. The coefficients for the black composition change variable are
positive and significant in the all member model and the white members only model.
Using a one-tailed test, the coefficient attains statistical significance is attained at the .02
level for all members and at the .05 level for white members. For all members, a 10%
change in black population is expected to lead to a .017 point change in Poole and
Rosenthal scores. For white members, a 10% change in black population will result in a
.015 point change in roll-call liberalism. Thus, white members seem to be somewhat less
responsive to changes in black population than non-white members. This is not a huge
effect, but because of the consistency in House members’ roll-call voting behavior any
change is worth noting. Also, this result confirms past research findings that House
members are responsive to changes in the racial composition of their district in
1993/1994.
Last, the coefficients for the black population post-redistricting variable did not
attain statistical significance. This suggests that although House members in 1993/1994
are responsive to changes in the black population, they are not responsive to levels of
black population as a constant. This is not to say that House members do not represent
the interests of their black constituents, but rather, there was a greater force influencing
their roll-call voting behavior in 1993/1994.
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In the 1993/1994 model, the only variables that prove to have a significant effect
on House members’ roll-call voting behavior are the House members’ previous roll-call
voting behavior and the district level change in black population from pre-redistricting to
post-redistricting. This suggests that in the early 1990s, House members may have been
preoccupied with the racial changes occurring in their constituency. This is not
surprising considering the national attention given to the 1990s redistricting process.
Interestingly, white House members were basically just as responsive to the changes as
non-white House members. This finding contradicts earlier findings by Bullock (1995)
and Whitby (1997) that show white House members to be unresponsive to racial
composition changes that occurred due to the 1990s redistricting.
The fact that white and non-white House members are both responsive to the
changes is also interesting, considering what we know about the descriptive nature of
constituents in each type of district. Most of districts represented by black and Hispanic
House members are majority non-white. On the other hand, most of the districts
represented by white House members are majority white. Thus, the level of black
population does not seem to have a discernible effect on House member’ responsiveness
to changes in that black population.
Regression Estimates for Poole and Rosenthal 1995/1996
The regression estimates for the 1995/1996 Poole and Rosenthal model are
presented in Table 5.2. Model 5.2 (a) includes 240 House members who served in
Congress from 1991 through 1996. Model 5.2 (b) is based on the 216 white House
members who served from 1991 through 1996. Both of these models achieve an adjusted
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Table 5.2: Parameter Values for Models of District Level Effects of Black Population Change on House Member's Voting Behavior
Using Poole and Rosenthal 95/96 Scores

All House Members

White House Members Only

(2a)
b

Intercept

(2b)
t

b

t

-0.143

- 7.835***

-0.125

-6.307***

Poole and Rosenthal 93/94

0.879

22.065***

0.873

21.141***

Party

0.137

7.303***

0.144

7.343***

South

- 0.098

- 4.971***

- 0.074

- 3.339***

Seniority

0.001

0.892

0.001

0.727

Change in DEM Population

- 0.001

-1.255

- 0.002

-1.474

Change in Black Population

-0.001

-0.513

0.001

0.662

Black Population Post Redist

0.001

- 0.002

-1.666**

Adjusted R2
N

** * significant at .01 level, o n e-tailed test
* * significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

2.154**

0.960
240

0.957
216

R2 of 0.96; although this is not as efficient as the 1993/1994 model, it still proves to be a
good fit.
As in the 1993/1994 model, past roll-call voting behavior proves to be a good
predictor of present roll-call voting behavior. This relationship is explained through the
inclusion of the lagged Poole and Rosenthal score.
Unlike the results from Table 5.1, party emerges as a significant variable in this
model. The party coefficient attains statistical significance at the .01 level. The
coefficient is also in the expected direction. Holding the effects of other variables
constant, Democratic House members are more liberal than Republican House members
are. This finding is sustained in both the all member model and the white members only
model.
The variable identifying southern members of the House also yields significant
coefficients in the expected direction. In 1995/1996, southern region appear to have an
effect on roll-call voting behavior, unlike in 1993/1994. Specifically, both white and
non-white members from the South are more conservative in their roll-call voting
behavior than other House members.
In 1995/1996 the coefficients for the partisan change variable falls short of
attaining statistical significance in the model including all members. In the model
including white members only, partisan changes in the district composition have a
negative and significant effect on roll-call voting behavior. This suggests that, although
white House members did not react to partisan changes directly after redistricting, they
were cognizant of the changes, and responded to them several years after redistricting
once the focus shifted away from racial considerations.
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As in the 1993/1994 model, seniority does not seem to have any identifiable effect
on roll-call voting behavior for white or non-white members in 1995/1996. The length of
time a member holds office does not impact his roll-call voting behavior.
The variables measuring black population change and black population postredistricting yield very interesting findings. In 1995/1996, the effect of black population
changes drops out. In both the all members model and the white members only model,
the changes in black population in the district due to redistricting do not have an effect on
House members roll-call voting behavior in 1995/1996. House members are no longer
contemplating the increase or decrease in the black percentage of their district when
voting. In effect, the responsiveness observed in 1993/1994 was not sustained several
years after redistricting.
Equally as interesting are the findings dealing with black population postredistricting. The black population post-redistricting has a positive and significant effect
on roll-call voting behavior in the model including all House members. Thus, in
1995/1996 members are not responding to the changes in black population, but instead
are responding to the constant level of black population in the district. This would
suggest that House members are taking into account the size of their black population
when making voting decisions in Congress, and therefore, are responsive to the racial
composition levels in their district. This outcome is to be expected. It would not be
effective for House members to concern themselves with the amount of change in black
population occurring three to four years earlier. Recognizing the goal of reelection,
House members should focus on the actual makeup of the current district when voting.
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The white members only model has a very different finding. In fact, the black
population level has a negative and significant effect on white members’ roll-call voting
behavior in 1995/1996. This finding implies that for white House members, the higher
the black population in 1995/1996, the more conservative their roll-call voting behavior.
This is commensurate with the threat hypothesis posited by Key (1949) or the hostility
hypothesis offered by Giles (1977). However, more recent studies assert that this inverse
relationship no longer exists (Voss 1996; Giles and Buckner 1996). Evidence reported
here strongly counter claims that the phenomenon known as threat or hostility no longer
exists.
In 1993/1994, the distinction is made that although white House members are not
responsive to the levels of black population in their districts, they are responsive to
changes in black population. Therefore, there seems to be no threat to black
representation. White House members responded to racial composition changes in the
expected manner.
In 1995/1996, white House members are no longer concerned with the racial
composition changes that occurred in their districts in the early 1990s. It is expected then
that the responsiveness toward the changes in black population will be replaced with
responsiveness toward the levels of black population. This in fact is the case. In
1995/1996 white House members are responsive to the level of black population.
However, their responsiveness is in an unexpected direction. The fact that white House
members become more conservative as their black population increases may actually
indicate that they are being responsive to the majority of the constituency, if the black
population does not exceed 50 percent.
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Regression Estimates for Change in Poole and Rosenthal 1991-1993 and 1991-1996
The regression estimates for the Poole and Rosenthal change model are presented
in Table 5.3. Model 5.3 (a) includes 304 House members who served in Congress from
1991 through 1993, and reports estimates for change in roll-call voting behavior between
those years. Model 5.3 (b) includes 240 House members who served in Congress from
1991-1996, and reports estimates for change in roll-call voting behavior between those
years. These models are included to test the validity of the baseline Poole and Rosenthal
model developed above. Due largely to the exclusion of the lagged Poole and Rosenthal
variable, the adjusted R2drops to 0.012 in Model 5.3 (a) and 0.311 in Model 5.3 (b). It is
important to note however that the findings are very similar to the findings in Model 5.1.
The change in black population is one of only two significant variables in the
1991-1993 change model. As expected, the larger the change in the black population the
larger the change in the Poole and Rosenthal scores.
Also in the model focusing on the change in voting behavior from 1991-1996, it
seems that more traditional factors effect House members voting behavior. However, the
black population level after redistricting seems to have a slight effect on the dependent
variable just as it did in the baseline model.
Regression Estimates for Model Including House Members in Office 1991-1996
The regression estimates for the model including only House members who
served at least from 1991-1996 are presented in Table 5.4. Model 5.4 (a) includes 240
House members who served in Congress from 1991-1996, and reports estimates for
change in roll-call voting behavior between 1991 and 1993. Model 5.4 (b) includes the
same 240 members in the previous model, and reports estimates for change in roll-call
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Table 5.3: Parameter Values for Models of Change in House Member's Voting Behavior for 1993 and 1996 Using Poole and
Rosenthal Scores

1993

1996

(3a)
b

Intercept

(3b)
t

0.037

4.726***

b

l

-0.106

- 5.382***

Party

-0.007

-1.718

0.078

8.539***

South

0.014

1.550

-0.064

- 3.223***

Seniority

0.000

1.020

0.001

0.569

Change in DEM Population

0.000

0.436

- 0.001

-0.743

Change in Black Population

0.002

2.089**

0.001

0.545

Black Population Post Redist

-0.000

0.001

1.318*

Adjusted R2
N

* * * significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
* * sig n ifican t at .05 level, one-tailed lest
i1 significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

- 0.330

0.012
304

0.311
240
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Table 5.4: Parameter Values for Models of District Level Effects of Black Population Change on House Member's Voting Behavior
For Members in Office from 1991-1996

1993

1996

(4a)
b

(4b)
t

b

t

Intercept

0.033

3.663*+*

-0.114

- 5.515***

Poole and Rosenthal 91/92

0.993

43.479***

0.892

19.762***

Party

-0.005

-0.516

0.124

5.812***

South

0.010

0.953

-0.085

- 3.954***

Seniority

0.000

0.504

0.001

0.983

Change in DEM Population

0.000

0.057

0.000

-1.083

Change in Black Population

0.001

1.830**

0.000

0.369

Black Population Post Rcdist

0.000

0.289

0.001

2.000**

Adjusted R2
N

**+ significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
* * significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

0.983
240

-

0.953
240

voting behavior between 1991 and 1996. By focuses exclusively on House members who
were in office throughout the entire time period, this allows a direct comparison of rollcall voting behavior and changes based on those factors hypothesized to have an effect.
The findings presented in Table 5.4 confirm the findings obtained from the baseline
Poole and Rosenthal model.
Discussion
I construct identical models for 1993/1994 and 1995/1996. However, the factors
that influence members’ roll-call voting behavior change drastically from one Congress
to the next. A comparison of the 1993/1994 and 1995/1996 Poole and Rosenthal models
provide several interesting findings. First of all, in 1993/1994 only two variables have a
significant effect on House members’ roll-call voting behavior. Lagged roll-call voting
behavior scores and the change in black population appear to be the only significant
explanatory factors in 1993/1994. The fact that House members’ roll-call voting
behavior remains constant over the years is a common and expected finding. However,
the fact that the change in black population is the only other variable to achieve
significance is noteworthy. The expectation is that the change in the black population
would effect House member’ roll-call voting behavior, along with other factors. It
appears that House members’ voting decisions were dominated by attention to racial
composition changes in their district. This preoccupation with race seems to have
overshadowed other factors that usually affect House members’ roll-call voting behavior.
In 1995/1996, on the other hand, several factors influence roll-call voting
behavior as reflected by the Poole and Rosenthal scores. The variables measuring a
member’s past roll-call voting behavior, party identification and region all prove to be
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significant. In addition, black population after redistricting, is significant. Thus, in
1995/1996, several factors influence House members’ roll-call voting behavior.
As mentioned above, the most striking finding concerns the relationship between
changes in black population and roll-call voting behavior versus levels of black
population and roll-call voting behavior. The primary question that the analysis seeks to
answer is: are House members responsive to changes in the racial composition of their
district? According to the results, the answer to this question is yes. Yes, House
members’ roll-call voting behavior is a function of the level of black population
proportion in their district. The assumption however, is that responsiveness implies
voting in a manner reflective of the interests of the constituency. For example, the larger
the black population, the more liberal the voting record of the House member, this
signifies a positive relationship. The fact that white House members are not responsive
in a positive manner to the black population level, is problematic and may suggest that
black interests may not be adequately represented at the congressional level in
1995/1996. However, this finding may simply suggest that the black population is not
large enough to affect the reelection prospects of House members, and thus they are
voting more in line with those in the political majority in their districts.
ADA ANALYSIS
Unlike Poole and Rosenthal scores, which range from -1 to 1, ADA scores range
from 0 to 100. As in the Poole and Rosenthal analysis, I begin with a brief explanation of
some of the important descriptive findings. First, I analyze the mean ADA scores of
white House members from 1991 to 1996. The average ADA score for white House
members dropped from 42 in 1991 to 34 in 1996. Interestingly, there was a rise in liberal
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roll-call voting behavior in 1992, followed by a continual drop in liberal voting among
white House members.

ADA scores plunged between 1993 and 1994.

There is a

possible explanation for such a large drop in such a short period of time.

With

redistricting coming to a close in 1991 and as late as 1992 for several states, House
members were unsure of the breakdown of their district composition. By 1994 House
members had a better grasp on their district composition and who within their district was
part of their reelection constituency. Average ADA scores are also tallied for all
members. As expected the inclusion of Hispanic and African American members of the
House inflates the ADA scores, but the pattern is unchanged.
Figures 5.4 through 5.9 display the distribution of ADA scores for white House
members from 199 to 1996.1 These charts show an interesting pattern. In 1991 ADA
scores are somewhat evenly distributed, with a slight conservative curve. In 1992 a
bimodal pattern begins to develop, with a high number of House members on each
extreme of the ADA scoring scale. In 1993, that bimodal pattern begins to breakdown,
and evidence of a conservative slant is exhibited. In 1994, there is an obvious drop in the
number of white House members with high ADA scores. The number of members with
low ADA scores remains constant in this year. The charts displaying ADA scores in
1995 and 1996 tell an interesting story. Notice the number of members in 1995 with an
ADA score of zero. Almost 120 of the 380 members included in the analysis have an
ADA score of zero, with the rest of the members distributed fairly evenly over the rest of
the scale. In 1996 the pattern continues, with approximately 170 of the 374 members

1 Figures including ail members are also constructed with marginal effects on the overall distribution of
score. There is a slight increase in frequency on the liberal side of the scale.
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included in the analysis reflecting ADA scores between zero and ten. Again the other
members are distributed evenly across the rest of the ADA scale.
The evidence presented in these charts give irrefutable support to the contention
that white House members have become increasingly more conservative in their roll-call
voting behavior from 1991-1996. The results of the multivariate analysis will shed light
on whether changes in the racial composition of the district are responsible for that trend.
Regression Estimates for ADA 1993
The regression estimates for the 1993 ADA model are presented in Table 5.5.
Model 5.5 (a) includes 304 House members who served in Congress from 1990 through
1993. Model 5.5 (b) includes only white House members, 277, who served from 1990
through 1993. Both of these models achieve an adjusted R2 of 0.95, which prove to be a
good fit.
Model 5.5 is a replication of the model used in an earlier work (Sharpe and
Garand 1994, unpublished). The results of this model can be compared with the results
obtained from the 1996 model. The coefficients for the lagged ADA scores further
corroborate evidence that there is consistency in House members’ roll-call voting
behavior. The coefficients for the lagged ADA variable attain statistical significance in
both models.
Second, the coefficients for the variable measuring party identification also attain
statistical significance in both models. This finding supports the idea that Democrats are
more liberal in their roll-call voting behavior than their Republican counterparts.
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Table 5.5: Parameter Values for Models of District Level Effects of Black Population Change on House Member's Voting Behavior
Using ADA 1993 Scores

All House Members

While House Members Only

(5a)
b

(5b)
t

0.036

b

t

Intercept

0.058

Average ADA 91/92

0.961

34.115***

0.994

32.622***

Party

2.014

2.210**

2.567

2.730***

South

-2.090

- 1.682**

- 0.969

Seniority

0.063

1.116

0.102

1.750**

Change in DEM Population

0.038

0.725

0.016

0.277

Change in Black Population

0.167

1.746**

0.231

2.213**

Black Population Post Redist

0.045

1.270

Adjusted Rj
N

* * * significant at .01 level, o n e-tailed test
* * significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

0.950
304

1.109

0.643

-0.704

-0.105

-1.591

0.948
277

Third, the coefficient for the South variable is negative and significant in both
models. This finding indicates that southern House members are more conservative in
their roll-call voting behavior than non-southern House members.
The coefficients for seniority remain positive through both models, but only attain
significance in the white members only model. This would suggest that the more years a
white House member serves in Congress, the more liberal he becomes. In addition,
changes in partisan composition of the district seem to have little effect on the roll-call
voting behavior of House members in 1993. The coefficient for the partisan change
variable does not achieve significance in either model. As mentioned earlier, this
counters results found in research using the 1980s redistricting (Glazer and Robbins
1985). It is possible that some other factor distinct to the 1990s redistricting
overshadowed partisan change.
That other factor may be the change in racial composition that resulted from the
1990s redistricting. In fact, coefficients for the variable measuring changes in district
level black population attain statistical significance in both models. It seems that for all
members of Congress, one major concern was being responsive to changes in the racial
composition of their district. This variable is central to the analysis. For the model
including all members, a 10% change in district level black population leads to a 1.6
point change in ADA score. For white members, the magnitude of the change is greater,
indicating that a 10% change in black population would lead to a 2.3% change in roll-call
voting behavior. These are not huge effects, liberal House members are still liberal and
conservative House members are still conservative, but small change does occur and the
findings are significant.
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Last, the coefficients for the black population post-redistricting is positive in the
all members model and negative in the white members only model. This would suggest
that as the size of the black population in a district grows, white House members actually
become more conservative in their roll-call voting behavior. This finding is inconclusive,
however, because neither model achieved statistical significance. In fact, in each model
this variable just fell short of attaining significance. The expected direction of this
coefficient is positive based on evidence that House members are responsive to their
constituency composition. With this in mind, a one-tailed test was used for the model
including all members, but significance was not attained. Due to the unexpected negative
coefficient in the white members only model, only a two-tailed test would be appropriate
in this model. Again, significance was not attained.
Regression Estimates for ADA 1996
The regression estimates for the 1996 ADA model are presented in Table 5.6.
Model 5.6 (a) includes 234 House members who served in Congress from 1991 through
1996. Model 5.6 (b) includes only white House members, 211, who served from 1991
through 1996. Both of these models achieve an adjusted R2of 0.93, which signals that
the models are a relatively good fit.
The first three variables maintain results captured from the 1993 ADA models.
Lagged ADA scores, partisan identification, and southern region all have statistically
significant and expected effects on ADA scores in 1996.
The variable identifying changes in partisan composition does not have an effect
in 1996 for the all member model or the white members only model. This is a variable in
which reaction would most likely have been observed directly after redistricting. In the
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Table 5.6: Parameter Values for Models of District Level Effects of Black Population Change on House Member’s Voting Behavior
Using ADA 1996 Scores

All House Members

While House Members Only

(6a)
b

(6b)
t

b

I

Intercept

3.515

1.453*

4.495

1.714**

Average ADA 91/92

0.853

21.770***

0.838

20.628***

Party

5.202

4.041***

5.613

4.183***

South

- 2.953

- 1.723**

-3.170

-1.646**

Seniority

-0.064

-0.737

-0.057

-0.600

Change in DEM Population

-0.082

-1.132

- 0.063

- 0.750

Change in Black Population

-0.025

-0.190

-0.010

- 0.070

Black Population Post Redist

0.010

0.211

- 0.079

-0.886

Adjusted R2
N

* ** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

0.929
234

0.925
211

early 1990s this did not occur, and it seems that there has been no lagged effect of district
level partisan change on the House members’ roll-call voting behavior.
Interestingly, the coefficients for the seniority variable in 1996 are in the opposite
direction of the coefficients in 1993. No substantive conclusion can be drawn from this
result however, because the coefficients for the seniority variable did not attain
significance in either model. This is an important finding considering that coefficients
for the seniority variable were significant at the .10 level in the 1993 white members only
model. This suggests that a member’s seniority is not necessarily associated with the
ideological nature of his roll-call voting behavior.
Results from the black population change variable enable me to explore whether
the responsiveness observed in 1993 carried over to 1996. The coefficients for the black
change variable are negative in both models. Further, they do not achieve significance in
either model. This indicates that the responsiveness observed in 1993 was not maintained
through the years. A full discussion of the implications of this finding follows, but first,
it is important to report the findings for the black population post-redistricting variable.
It would be plausible to expect the black population post-redistricting to take the place of
the effect that the changes in black population had on House members’ roll-call voting
behavior.
This is not the case. The coefficients for the variable measuring black population
after redistricting do not attain significance in either model. The coefficients are in the
same direction as the 1993 model, with white members showing a propensity to vote
more conservatively as the numbers of blacks in their district increase.
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According to ADA scores, the racial composition of the district does not influence
House members’ roll-call voting behavior in 1996. Interestingly, neither white House
members nor non-white House members seem to be responsive to race in the 1990s. This
result may reflect the fact that there is some overlap in the variables. Lagged scores and
partisan identification may diminish the raw effects of race on roll-call voting behavior.
Discussion
The determinants of House members’ roll-call voting behavior change noticeably
between 1993 and 1996. In general, in 1993 more factors influenced House members’
decision making on legislation. Using identical models in 1993 and 1996, seniority and
change in black population are significant factors in both the all members model and the
white members only in 1993. However, the impact of these variables drops out in the
1996 model. It appears that House members in 1996 are driven by the more traditional
factors thought to affect House members’ roll-call voting behavior (e.g., lagged voting
scores, party identification southern region.) After the 1990s redistricting, no white
House members represented majority-black districts. It may be plausible that white
members are not responding to levels of black population because the black constituency
is inconsequential to them. It is somewhat perplexing that non-white House members do
not seem to be influenced by the size of the black population in their district. One
possible explanation is that any aspect of roll-call voting behavior associated with the
racial composition of the district may be captured in the lagged ADA score. Also,
African American members have been accused of not representing the wishes of their
district, and taking on the representative role of “trustee”, rather than that of “delegate”
(Swain 1993).
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Regardless of the possible reasons why neither the black population change
variable or the black population level variable is significant, this is a finding that will
require additional analysis in the future.
CONCLUSION
One of the main thrusts of this dissertation is to analyze whether the congressional
responsiveness in roll-call voting behavior in 1993 was maintained several years after
redistricting. The analyses in this chapter indicate that House members did not remain
responsive to the changes in black population proportions. This is an important finding
indicating that changes in racial composition had an effect on roll-call voting behavior
immediately after redistricting, but that was the extent of the impact.
There seems to be little long-term effect of the changes that took place due to
redistricting in the 1990s. An argument could be made that this is an expected outcome.
In 1995 and 1996 House members may not be responsive to changes that occurred up to
six years ago. Instead they may be responsive to the levels of black population that they
have had since redistricting. According to the Poole and Rosenthal analyses, this does
prove to be the case. House members are no longer responsive to the change in black
population, but they are now responsive to the level of black population. According to
the ADA analyses, not only are House members unresponsive to the changes in black
population, they are unresponsive to the levels of black population as well.
As a whole, House members have become increasingly conservative. Factors
other than change in black percentage or levels of black percentage in a district must be
responsible for this rightward shift. This evidence is contradictory to the idea that House

101

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

membership has become more conservative as a result of the race-based redistricting of
the 1990s.
The discrepant findings between the Poole and Rosenthal analysis and the ADA
analysis justify the inclusion of both measures in this dissertation. The most obvious
discrepancy deals with the role of black population levels several years after redistricting.
The basic question asked is: does the level of black population have an effect on House
members’ roll-call voting behavior in the middle 1990s? In other words, is there a
pattern observed that, based on the level of black population in a district, people have
similar voting records? When relying on the Poole and Rosenthal scores, all roll-call
votes are included. When analyzing all votes a pattern exists. On the other hand, when
relying on the ADA scores, approximately 20 roll-call votes are included. According to
the 20 votes, a pattern does not exist.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the ADA along with other interest groups may bias
their ratings toward extreme ideological positions. Thus, an interpretation of the ADA’s
analysis on black population levels might conclude that there is no evidence that
members show signs of extreme liberalism or conservatism based on the level of black
population. On the other hand, an interpretation of the Poole and Rosenthal analysis may
conclude that members show tendencies toward the liberal or conservative ideology
based on the level of black population.
It is important to note that this distinction is not made throughout the above
explanations of each model. However, it is important for the reader to consider the fact
that Poole and Rosenthal and ADA measure slightly different phenomenon.
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Chapters 6 will delve deeper into what role the 1990s redistricting played on the
rightward shift in Congress. This chapter is concerned with whether the redistricting is
partly responsible for the changing partisanship of Congress.
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CHAPTER 6
CANDIDATE EMERGENCE
The 1994 elections marked the first time since Reconstruction that Republicans
made up a majority of the southern congressional delegation. A small number of scholars
have attempted to determine how many of the Republican victories were direct results of
the creation of majority-black districts. As mentioned earlier, knowing the actual number
is not as important as understanding why the creation of these districts would cause such
an upheaval. One explanation is that more quality Republican challengers emerged in
affected districts because their prospects of winning were enhanced. The premise is that
majority-black districts are created by pulling blacks from surrounding districts. Not
only does this leave the subsequent districts overwhelmingly white, but also it diminishes
a large liberal voting bloc in the district. The result is more conservative districts that
offer a better chance of electoral success for prospective Republican candidates. I expect
to see this relationship, especially in the South, where the bulk of the race-based
redistricting took place. Also, high quality challengers are expected to emerge in districts
where the incumbent House members were not responsive to constituency composition
changes. Discrepant voting records make House members more vulnerable and more
likely to be faced with serious challenge because it serves as a point of attack for the
challenger. I test the effect of the creation of majority-black districts on the emergence of
quality challengers in 1994 and 1996.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Regression Estimates for Incumbent Margin of Victory
As explained in Chapter 4, before testing a model of candidate emergence I must
first construct a model predicting incumbent vote.

By including different types of

political experience in the model, I am able to obtain estimates on the impact each type of
experience has on the percentage of the total vote the incumbent receives. The results of
this model allow me to devise a hierarchical scale of challenger quality. The coefficients
for different types of political experience are ranked ordered. That ranking then becomes
the measure of challenger quality used in the subsequent model. I contend that the larger
the coefficient for a certain type of challenger political experience, the smaller the margin
of victory for the incumbent.
The regression estimates for the incumbent vote analysis are presented in Table
6.1. I report the model for 1994, but also conducted analyses for 1992 and 1996 yielding
similar results.

The most important variables measure different types of candidate

experience. Challengers with local office experience reduce incumbent vote by 14.646,
in comparison to those challengers with no experience. Candidates with state legislative
experience reduce the incumbent vote by 14.317, while those candidates with statewide
experience reduce the incumbent vote by 23.512.
coefficients are negative as expected.

It important to notice that the

With the margin of incumbent victory as the

dependent variable, these results suggest that challengers with local office or state
legislative experience decreases the vote percentage for the incumbent. The impact of
holding local or state legislative office is basically the same. On the other hand, in races
where the challenger has held statewide office, the incumbent margin of victory is even
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Table 6.1: Parameter Values for Models of House Incumbent Margin of Victory in 1994

Incumbent House Members
b

t

Intercept

12.901

2.415***

Previous Incumbent Margin

0.491

7.444***

Local Office Experience

-14.646

-1.748**

State Legislative Experience

-14.317

-2.022**

Statewide Office Experience

-23.512

-1.858**

Member of President’s Party

-16.011

-9.601***

0.324

2.657***

District Level Presidential Vote 1992

Adjusted Rj
N

* * * significant at .01 level, o n e-tailed test
** sig n ifican t at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

0.399
243

smaller. The impact of statewide office is almost double that of the other two types of
political experience.
Because the coefficients for local and state legislative experience are equal, these
two categories of political experience are combined to form the second level on the
hierarchical scale of challenger quality. Those challengers who did not have any political
experience represent the first level (and lowest level) of the scale. Candidates who have
statewide experience will represent the third and highest level of challenger quality.
Thus, the dependent variable in the challenger quality analysis is measured as a threepoint scale, with 0 being no political experience, 1 being local and state legislative
experience, and 2 being statewide office experience.
Regression Estimates for Quality Challenger Emergence 1994
Having constructed the dependent variable, the task now is to answer the
question: what explains variation in challenger quality across districts?
The regression estimates for the 1994 quality challenger model are presented in
Table 6.2. Model 6.2 (a) includes 234 districts in which an incumbent House member’s
congressional seat was challenged in 1994. Model 6.2 (b) includes only white incumbent
House members (N=210) who faced a challenge in 1994. It is also important to note that
the number of cases also reflects the inclusion of the variable comparing roll-call voting
behavior from 1991 to 1996 (responsiveness), which further reduces the sample size. In
both models in Table 6.2, the dependent variable is the three-point challenger quality
scale; each model is estimated using ordered logit.
First, in Model 6.2 (a), the coefficient for incumbents’ previous margin of victory
is negative and significant. This finding indicates that as House incumbents’ margin of
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Table 6.2: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1994

All House Members

White House Members Only

(2a)

b

(2b)

I

Incumbent Margin of Victory 1992

0.348

- 2.373**+

District Level Presidential Vote 1992

-0.008

Member of President's Party
Race-Based Redistricted State

b

t

■0.033

-2.190**

- 0.246

0.019

0.497

0.277

0.832

0.327

0.953

• 0.432

-0.710

-0.228

- 0.363

Responsiveness to Racial Changes

4.596

2.173**

5.523

2.505**

Cut 1
Cut 2

1.794
3.593

1.460
1.531

3.181
4.937

1.728
1.793

o

oo

Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
N

* * * significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

0.082

0.079

-74.216

-70.078

234

210

victory in the last election increases, the quality of the challenger decreases. As should
be expected, a House incumbent who wins by a large percentage in the previous
congressional race will, barring scandal, retain that popularity in the following election.
This is also consistent with the strategic politician theory. Calculating prospective
candidates run for office in congressional races that they believe they can win. A high
level of popularity, reflected in a large margin of victory, discourages the strategic
politician from challenging the incumbent. Strategic prospective candidates will not
waste precious time and resources on a campaign they cannot win.
Second, the coefficient measuring the district level presidential vote does not
attain significance. This suggests that challengers’ decision to compete for a House seat
is not influenced by the popularity of the president in the district, regardless of the party
with which the challenger identifies.
Third, there does not seem to be a relationship between the quality of the
challenger and whether the incumbent identifies with the same party as the president.
The coefficient is in the expected positive direction, however, possibly signifying the
influence of a midterm election.
Fourth, congressional races occurring in states that have undergone race-based
redistricting in the 1990s are no more likely to generate quality challengers than other
states. The coefficient for this variable carries a negative sign, and does not attain
statistical significance.
The finding of most interest deals with how responsive House members are to the
changes in the composition of their constituencies. The variable measuring
responsiveness to racial composition changes in the district is positive and significant.
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Recall that the responsiveness variable accounts for any ideological discrepancies
between expected and actual roll-call voting behavior changes as a result of shifts in the
racial composition of districts. Therefore, the higher the value the less responsive the
House member is; the less responsive the House member, the higher the expected quality
of the challenger. Thus, House members unresponsive to changes in their constituency
were held accountable through more rigorous electoral competition.
This is an extremely important finding. Simply put, those House members who
did not change their roll-call voting behavior to reflect their new constituencies were
more likely to face a high-quality challenger. This finding is also compatible with
strategic politician theory. Strategic politicians considering candidacy evaluate the
incumbent House members’ roll-call voting behavior, or overall ideology, in an effort to
determine whether it is commensurate with the interests of the constituency.
Model 6.2 (b), focusing exclusively on white House members, yields similar
findings. The only two variables that attain significance are the incumbent margin of
victory in the previous election and the variable measuring ideological discrepancy. For
white House members as well, the larger the ideological discrepancy between the
expected and predicted roll-call voting behavior based on changes in racial composition,
the more likely the were met with a strong challenge. For white members the magnitude
of the coefficient increases slightly, suggesting that unresponsive white House members
were more likely than others to face a quality challenger in 1994.
A second model is constructed by including a variable identifying the party of the
challenger. The results are presented in Table 6.3. The variable identifying whether the
incumbent identifies with the same party of the president is excluded and a variable
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Table 6.3: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Alternative Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1994

All House Members

While House Members Only

(3a)
b

(3b)
t

b

t

Incumbent Margin of Victory 1992

- 0.333

- 2.084**

District Level Presidential Vote 1992

- 0.200

- 0.630

0.007

0.198

Race-Based Rcdistricted State

- 0.329

- 0.540

-0.117

-0.118

Challenger Party

-0.346

- 1.619*

-0.368

- 1.562*

-0.031

Responsiveness to Racial Changes

4.885

2.493***

5.667

C ull
Cut 2

1.306
3.125

1.468
1.537

2.698
4.473

Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
N

* * * significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
* * significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

- 1.909**

2.759***

1.730
1.793

0.112

0.107

-71.838

-67.883

234

210

identifying the party of the challenger is included in the analysis. As explained in
Chapter 4, these variables explain slightly different phenomenon. This variable
specifically captures partisan trends in a given year (i.e., are Republican challengers
stronger on average than Democratic challengers). For that reason, it is important to
include a variable that explicitly identifies the party of the challenger.
The two variables that attain significance in the baseline model retain significance
in this model. The challenger party variable also attains statistical significance.
According to these results, quality candidates who challenged incumbents were more
likely to identify with the Republican Party. This implies that Democratic incumbents
were more likely to face challenge by high quality candidates than Republican
incumbents were.
This is a very important finding. It offers evidence that the quality of Republican
candidates was high throughout the nation. A model including only southern districts can
be tested in order to observe whether this relationship persists when examining the
southern states exclusively.
Similar findings can be observed for white House members. Again, the same
variables that attain significance for all members, attain significance for white House
members. For white House members, the more quality challengers were Republican.
Also, unresponsiveness in roll-call voting behavior led to higher quality challengers.
Again, the magnitude of the coefficient for white members is markedly higher than for
other members.
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Regression Estimates for Quality Candidate Emergence 1996
The regression estimates for the quality candidate emergence in 1996 are
presented in Table 6.4. Model 6.4 (a) includes 238 incumbent House members who
faced a challenger in 1996. Model 6.4 (b) is based on 214 white incumbent House
members who were challenged in 1996. The number of cases also reflects the inclusion
of the variable comparing roll-call voting behavior from 1991 to 1996 (responsiveness),
which further reduces the sample size.
In the 1996 congressional election, the most important explanatory variable
appears to be the incumbent’s margin of victory in the previous election. The coefficient
has a negative sign, indicating that the lower the incumbent’s margin of victory, the
higher the quality of the challenger. This is as would be expected.
Second, the coefficient measuring the district level presidential vote does not
attain significance. The coefficient for this variable is multiplied by -1 for Republican
incumbents, and 1 for Democratic incumbents. In 1996, the expectation is that for
Republican House members, as the district level (democratic) presidential vote increases,
the quality of the challenger would increase. This however, does not appear to be the
case, and the coefficient is not in the expected direction.
Third, similar to the results reported in 1994, the fact that an incumbent House
member is of the same party as the president does not seem to have an effect on candidate
emergence. The coefficient remains positive, which is not the expected result in 1996.
Fourth, the fact that a state experienced race-based redistricting in the 1990s does
not impact whether quality challengers emerge in House elections. In other words,
congressional races in those states that underwent race-based redistricting were no more
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Table 6.4: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1996

All House Members

While House Members Only

(4a)
b

Incumbent Margin of Victory 1994

- 0.023

District Level Presidential Vote 1996

0.004

Member of President's Party

(4b)
I

b

I

•0.023

-2.281**

0.231

0.009

0.384

0.204

0.759

0.276

0.989

0.221

- 0.494

- 0.062

-0.134

Responsiveness to Racial Changes

1.534

0.902

1.814

1.025

Cut 1
C ut2

1.217
5.208

0.991
1.398

1.542
5.476

1.243
1.589

Race-Based Redistricted State

Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
N

* * * significant at .01 level, o ne-tailed test
* * significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, o ne-tailed test

-

- 2.443***

0.055

0.062

-109.267

-99.629

238

214

likely to have an increased number of higher quality challengers than states that did not
experience race-based redistricting.
The contention made is that the race-based redistricting seemingly caused such
uncertainty in the congressional district plans and congressional elections in the affected
states. Because of the upheaval, prospective candidates would view the incumbents as
more vulnerable due to possible shifts in their district composition. This however, does
not prove to be the case. Thus the fact that a state underwent race-based redistricting
does not appear to have a direct impact on the emergence of higher quality challengers.
Fifth, in the 1996 model, the responsiveness variable drops out. In the 1996
election, House members who did not adequately represent the racial changes in their
district were not met higher quality challengers than other House members. Thus, it
appears that the 1996 election was too far removed from the 1990s race-based
redistricting and the constituency changes that occurred as a result. Prospective
candidates did not hold the incumbent accountable for a lack of responsiveness that
occurred directly after race-based redistricting.
Table 6.4 (b) reports the findings for the model focusing on white incumbent
House members. The model yields similar results, with incumbent margin of victory
being the only variable to attain statistical significance. In this model as in the model
including all members, the responsiveness variable no longer achieves significance.
White House members are also not met with quality challengers based on their
responsiveness to changes occurring in their district composition in the early 1990s.
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In Model 6.5, a variable indicating the party of the challenger is included. The
results are presented for all House members in Table 6.5 (a), and for white House
members only in Table 6.5 (b).
According to this model, in the 1996 House elections, the coefficient for the
variable measuring incumbent margin of victory in the previous election attains statistical
significance. All other variables fail to achieve significance. These results carry through
to the white members only model as well. An important observation is that in 1996,
quality challengers are no more apt to identify with the Republican Party. This suggests
that there is not a long-term relationship between challengers identifying with the
Republican Party and having more political experience. This effect is only observed
directly after redistricting suggesting that it is the likely result of the race-based
redistricting.
Regression Estimates for Quality Challenger Emergence 1994 - South Only
I have also constructed a model focusing exclusively on the southern states in
order to determine whether the results discussed above can be observed when examining
the southern states alone. A model focusing on the South is important because, through
this analysis, we begin to understand what impact occurrences unique to the South have
on candidate emergence. In particular, we recognize that race-based redistricting was
largely limited to the South. It is important to ascertain whether the variables included in
the models above, based on all states, have different or exaggerated effects. If, in fact,
the effects of key variables are stronger in the South, there is evidence that race-based
redistricting may have been influential in the emergence of more quality challengers.
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Table 6.5: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Alternative Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1996

All House Members

While House Members Only

(5a)
b

Incumbent Margin of Victory 1994
District Level Presidential Vote 1996

(5b)
I

- 0.029

- 3.112***

b

t

■0.030

-

2 .979* * *

0.139

0.829

0.024

1.073

■0.264

- 0.585

•0.035

- 0.076

Challenger Party

0.109

1.131

0.124

1.107

Responsiveness to Racial Changes

0.754

0.476

0.680

0.407

Cut 1
Cut 2

1.352
5.349

0.974
1.386

1.812
5.750

1.228
1.578

Race-Based Redistricted State

Pseudo Rl
Log Likelihood
N

* * * significant at .01 level, on e-tailed test
* * significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* sig n ifican t at .10 level, o ne-tailed test

0.058

0.063

-108.969

-99.565

238

214

Model 6.6 includes all House members in the South who were met with a challenger in
1994 (N = 64). The models concentrating on the South generate interesting results.
In Model 6.6 (a), the margin of victory of the incumbent does not seem to be an
important factor in determining whether a quality challenger emerges in the 1994
election. This is an important finding considering the effect of this variable in the full
models analyzed above. The incumbent margin of victory is the most important
determinant of challenger quality emergence above, but in the South this effect drops out
completely. Some other phenomenon must be driving prospective candidates’ decisions
in the South in 1994.
The variable measuring district level presidential vote in 1992 falls short of
attaining significance. In fact, if a one-tailed test is applied, this variable does attain
significance. However, because the coefficient carries an unexpected positive sign, a
two-tailed test must be applied.
The fact that an incumbent House member identifies with the same party as the
president does not appear to have a discernible effect.
Last, the coefficient for the variable measuring the effect of responsiveness is
positive and significant in the South model. Those members in the South who were not
responsive to the racial composition changes in their district were met with high quality
challengers. Notably, the magnitude of this variable (20.074) takes a huge leap from the
magnitude (4.596) reported in results presented in Table 6.2 (a).
This finding indicates that incumbent House members in the South who were
unresponsive to constituency changes that occurred after the 1990s redistricting were
much more likely to be faced with quality challengers than their non-South counterparts.
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Table 6.6: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1994 for South Only

Baseline

Alternative

(6a)

(6b)
b

Incumbent Margin of Victory 1992

t

- 0.028

■0.740

-0.017

■0.482

District Level Presidential Vote 1994

0.160

1.342

0.114

0.936

Member of President's Party

0.115

0.137
■0.363

-0.950

Challenger Party
Responsiveness to Racial Changes

20.074

2.225**

Cut 1
Cut 2

13.869
14.727

7.283
7.312

19.295

2.251***

vo

Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
N

* * * significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
* * significant at .05 level, one-tailed lest
* significant a t .10 level, one-tailed test

7.081
7.120

11.803
12.725

0.295

0.341

-12.509

-11.680

64

64

This suggests an increased awareness on the part of prospective candidates in the South
to analyze incumbents’ voting records in relation to the 1990s redistricting.
In Model 6.6 (b), a variable identifying the challengers’ party is included in the
analysis. Again the only variable attaining statistical significance is the responsiveness
variable. Interestingly, the party of the challenger, which attained significance in the full
model, is not significant in the South only model. Republican challengers do not seem to
be the quality challengers in the South that they seem to be in the non-South in 1994.
Regression Estimates for Quality Candidate Emergence 1996 - South Only
Model 6.7 includes all House members in the South who were met with a
challenger in 1996 (N = 66). In Model 6.7 (a), as well as 6.7 (b), which includes the
party of the challenger, the variable measuring incumbent House members’
responsiveness to constituency changes does not attain significance. As in the full model,
in the South, House members’ roll-call voting behavior is taken into account directly after
redistricting, but not several years after redistricting.
In Models 6.7 (a) and 6.7 (b), no variable achieves significance. This is an
unexpected finding. It seems plausible that the effect of incumbent House members’
unresponsiveness to constituency changes may have overshadowed the effect of the
incumbent margin of victory variable. However, once the effect of the responsiveness
variable drops out, it would seem likely that the incumbency margin of victory would
emerge as a significant factor in determining candidate emergence.
Discussion
Note that the models explain a relatively small amount of the variance. The
Pseudo R2ranges from .05 to .34. The level of performance of these models is
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Table 6.7: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1996 for South Only

Baseline

Alternative

(7a)
b

Incumbent Margin of Victory 1994
District Level Presidential Vote 1996
Member of President’s Party

•

(7b)
I

0.008

0.441

0.002

- 0.041

1.187

0.777

Challenger Party
Responsiveness to Racial Changes

Cut 1

Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
N

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
* * significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

- 2.005

- 0.493

2.138

2.180

b

t

0.010

-0.696

0.029

0.740

■0.052

- 0.303

2.102

- 0.559

2.271

2.347

-

-

0.113

0.066

-24.902

-26.215

66

66

commensurate with other similar studies on challenger quality (Bond, Covington, and
Fleisher 1985; Squire 1989). As Bond et al. explain, there are several “personal and
idiosyncratic” factors that prospective candidates consider that are unquantifiable. In
addition, several national forces that impact decisions to run for office are excluded from
the analysis due to the nature of the analysis and its focus on local forces. Due to the
low explanatory power of the models, these findings cannot be considered definitive.
Having said this, the analyses manage to yield several significant findings which do have
explanatory worth.
The analyses have been divided into three separate groups in this chapter. I have
examined the effect of several variables on candidate emergence in congressional races
that included all incumbent House members, white incumbent House members only, and
southern incumbent House members only. The analyses yield different results and these
differences are interesting and noteworthy.
First of all, in the 1994 baseline model (Model 6.2), it is apparent that incumbent
House members who were not responsive to the racial changes that occurred in their
constituency attracted higher quality challengers. Presumably, the prospective candidates
made themselves aware of the altered composition of the district, the House members
roll-call voting behavior, and/or the incumbent House members’ party identification
when deciding whether to run for office. In addition, those challengers who identified
themselves as Republicans were more likely to be the quality challengers in 1994, or in
other words, Democratic incumbents were faced with stronger challengers in 1994.
However, in 1996, quality House candidates did not emerge at a higher rate in
congressional races against House incumbents who were unresponsive to racial
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composition changes in their district. In effect, prospective challengers in 1994 were
aware of district level factors that were affected by the 1990s redistricting. In 1994, those
strategic politicians chose to compete for office in districts where the House member did
not change their roll-call voting behavior to reflect the changed constituency
composition. Those truly strategic challengers attempted to take immediate advantage of
the upheaval that the 1990s redistricting caused.
The models focusing on white House members yields basically the same results,
with the only difference being that the magnitude of the coefficient for the House
members’ responsiveness to district constituency change. White incumbent House
members who were not responsive to racial changes in their constituency were more
likely to face a formidable challenger in 1994.
More important for the purpose of this dissertation is the impact of the
independent variables on candidate emergence in the South. If the analysis of the South
yielded similar findings to the full model, then conclusions can be drawn about the
impact of the 1990s race-based redistricting on Republican, conservative candidate
emergence. However, the analysis focusing on the South yields different results.
First, the incumbent margin of victory in the previous election does not attain
statistical significance in any of the South models. Essentially, safe incumbents in 1994
are equally likely to face a strong challenge in 1996, as those incumbents winning by
small margins in 1994. This finding is perplexing considering the importance of this
variable in the full model.
It is possible that the effect of lack of responsiveness overshadows all other
factors. Incumbent House members in the South were held accountable for their
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ideological discrepancy to a much larger extent than non-South members. Yet, once the
effect of responsiveness drops out in the 1996 models, the incumbent margin of victory
variable does not become significant.
Also interesting is the fact that the variable identifying challenger party does not
attain significance in any of the South models. This indicates that the emergence of
quality challengers in the South is not associated with the party identification of the
challenger. In the full model, the Republican challengers were the more quality
challengers. In the South model, this does not appear to be the case.
This finding brings into question the contention that the race-based redistricting
which occurred in the southern states in the 1990s influenced the partisan makeup in the
House of Representatives. In fact, there does not appear to be any evidence to suggest
that the South gave rise to increased numbers of quality Republican challengers. Thus, it
appears that the southern states did not play an exaggerated role in the Republican
takeover of Congress in the 1990s.
RE-SPECIFIED MODELS
Models Using ADA Scores
Identical analyses are conducted using ADA scores. The models yield somewhat
similar results in 1994, but there are notable differences in the analysis. The results for
the ADA analyses are presented in Table 6.8 and 6.9.
As in the baseline model using Poole and Rosenthal, previous incumbent margin
of victory and ideological discrepancy are the two statistically significant factors in the
model. However, once the variable identifying challenger party is included in the model,
the responsiveness variable loses significance. Yet, the challenger party variable
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Table 6.8: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality 1994 Using ADA Scores

Baseline

Alternative
(8b)

(8a)

b

Incumbent Margin of Victory 1992

- 0.036

District Level Presidential Vote 1994

-

Member of President's Party

t

Race-Based Redistricted State

t

- 2.326***

- 0.034

■2.141**

0.011

■0.345

-0.036

•1.204

-0.157

• 0.529
■0.184

■1.310*

-0.401

-0.667

Challenger Party

N
u>)

b

- 0.390

■0.650

Responsiveness to Racial Changes

0.064

1.420+

0.043

0.980

Cut 1
Cut2

1.162
2.938

1.375
1.444

- 0.037
1.748

1.276
1.342

Pseudo R
Log Likelihood
N

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

0.066

0.080

-75.606

-74.503

235

235
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Table 6.9: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1996 Using ADA Scores

Alternative

Baseline

(9b)

(9a)
b

I

- 2.281

- 0.026

District Level Presidential Vote 1996

0.003

0.158

0.007

0.440

Member of President's Party

0.024

0.094
0.114

1.189

-0.414

-0.892

-

Challenger Party
Race-Based Redistricted State

o\

t

0.022

Incumbent Margin of Victory 1994

tNJ

b

Responsiveness to Racial Changes

0.071

Cull
Cut 2

1.346
5.378

Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
N

* * * significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

-0.613

• 0.277

2.016**

0.951
1.373

- 2.775***

0.071

2.053**

1.428
5.467

0.853
1.305

0.069

0.075

-107.788

-107.132

239

239

achieves significance. The coefficient is negative, suggesting as in the Poole and
Rosenthal model that the Republican challengers were the higher quality challengers.
Also, of interest is the fact that the responsiveness variable maintains significance
from 1994 to 1996. In all other models, this variable drops out in 1996. I assert that the
effect of the responsiveness variable drops out in 1996 because the attention to certain
district level factors has waned. The different results speak to the phenomenon that each
measure represents. Because ADA scores include the more extreme votes, discrepancy
from expected ADA scores is magnified. Also, because of the small number of votes
used in the ADA scores compared to the Poole and Rosenthal scores, not voting as
expected on three out of 20 votes yields different results than note voting as expected on
three out of 125 votes. Thus, the responsiveness variable is a much more extreme
variable in the model using ADA scores.
Model Using Dichotomous Challenger Quality Variable
In an effort to test the accuracy and utility of the scaled challenger quality variable
constructed in this chapter, I test the baseline challenger quality models using a
dichotomous challenger quality variable.
Specifically, any incumbent challenger with experience in elective political office
is assigned a one. Any incumbent challenger with no experience in elective political
office is assigned a zero. Also, the variable measuring responsiveness employs the Poole
and Rosenthal scores.
The models presented in Table 6.10 and 6.11 yield identical results to the model
using the scaled dependent variable. Furthermore, the model using the scaled dependent
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Table 6.10: Parameter Values for Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1994 Using Dichotomous Dependent
Variable

Baseline

Alternative

(10a)

(10b)

b

Intercept

1.624

Incumbent Margin of Victory 1992

- 0.035

District Level Presidential Vote 1994

-

Member of President's Parly

ts)
oo

t

-

1.102

Responsiveness to Racial Changes

Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
N

* * * significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
* * significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test

t

1.152

- 0.779

-2.361***

- 0.033

-2.087**

0.001

- 0.358

- 0.023

-0.706

0.320

0.948
■0.367

-1.612*

-0.432

-0.702

Challenger Party
Race-Based Redistricted State

b

- 0.523

-0.849

4.587

2.134**

4.784

2.400***

0.094

0.127

-64.038

-61.665

234

234
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Table 6.11: Parameter Values for Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1996 Using Dichotomous Dependent
Variable

Baseline

Alternative

(11a)

Intercept
Incumbent Margin of Victory 1994

to

(lib)

1.226

1.221

■0.023

- 2.466+**

District Level Presidential Vole 1996

0.005

0.236

Member of President's Party

0.203

0.751

Challenger Party
Race-Based Redistricted State
Responsiveness to Racial Changes

Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
N

+** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
* * significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailcd test

b

t

1.355

1.385

-0.030

•3.137***

0.014

0.827

0.108

1.117

■0.217

-0.485

-0.259

■0.573

1.594

0.937

0.826

0.521

0.058

0.061

-104.470

-104.181

238

238

variable does not seem to have a greater explanatory value than the simple dichotomous
variable suggested by Jacobson (1983).
CONCLUSION
The task to be accomplished in this chapter was to determine what effect the
1990s race-based redistricting had on the emergence of strong Republican candidates in
the 1994 and 1996 House elections.
In the model that includes all House members, Republican candidates prove to be
the higher quality candidates in 1994. Conversely, this effect is not maintained in the
model that includes only southern House members. Therefore, in 1994, Democratic
incumbents in the South do not draw stronger challengers than their southern Republican
incumbents.
Also, a variable identifying states that had experienced race-based redistricting
was also included in the Poole and Rosenthal models for all House members. This
variable does not attain significance in any model. Thus, states that underwent
redistricting were no more likely than other states to attract more quality challengers.
Further, quality challengers did emerge in districts where the House member was
not responsive to the racial changes in the district. However, this is not a phenomenon
limited to the South. In the 1994 model including all members and the model including
Southern members only, incumbent members were held accountable in for not voting the
interests of their district. For the purposes of this analysis, the prospective challenger,
and not the voter, renders accountability.
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Another interesting finding deals with the analyses that focus on white incumbent
House members. It appears that white House members are held to a higher standard
when it comes to representing changes in the black constituency. The results in this
chapter show that white House members are much more likely to face a quality
challenger if they do not adequately change their roll-call voting behavior to reflect racial
composition changes.
A possible explanation for this effect is that because blacks are considered a
liberal voting bloc, losing or gaining a substantial number of blacks should inevitably
lead to a marked shift in roll-call voting behavior. In many instances, the white House
member may not be willing to make the extreme shift necessary to please the new
constituency. Recognizing this dilemma, quality challengers will emerge, whether or not
they are aware of the white incumbents’ voting record.
Another possible explanation is that black House members are difficult to defeat
once they have won a congressional seat (Swain 1993). Recognizing this, strategic
politicians will not waste their time analyzing the roll-call voting behavior of black
House members. Prospective challengers realize that, even if the incumbent black House
member is not responsive to racial composition changes, he or she will still likely
experience electoral success.
To summarize, this chapter does not offer support for the contention that the loss
of a substantial number of Democratic House seats can be attributed to the creation of
majority-black districts.
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It appears that the success the Republicans experienced in the House elections
1994 and 1996, was a nationwide phenomenon that was in no way magnified in the
southern states where race-based redistricting occurred.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Between 1980 and 1990, the laws regulating redistricting changed drastically in
favor of minority representation. The change began with the 1982 Amendments to the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and continued with the 1986 Supreme Court Case, Thornburg
v. Gingles, which was widely interpreted to mean that states should create majorityminority districts whenever possible. The positive change ended after the 1990s
redistricting and the effort by many states and the Justice Department to comply with the
Supreme Court directive.
The desired goal was the elimination of discrimination based on mainly on race or
ethnicity in the electoral system. The Court and the Justice Department could claim
victory. As stated in Chapter 1, there was a marked increase in the number of victorious
minority representatives in the 1992 House of Representatives’ elections compared to
previous elections.
However, there were also unintended consequences that occurred due to the racebased redistricting. In particular, many critics have questioned the role that the creation
of majority-black districts played on the increased conservatism in the House. In this
dissertation I examine two factors in an effort to determine whether the effects of the
1990s race-based redistricting have continued throughout the 1990s, and what effect the
redistricting has had on the overall representation of blacks at the congressional level. In
essence, has the formation of majority-black districts inadvertently led to a more
conservative Congress in both its roll-call voting behavior and its partisan makeup?
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ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR
The first effect of race-based redistricting examined is roll-call voting behavior.
Directly after redistricting, House members appeared to change their roll-call voting
behavior in response to changes in the black population of their constituency (Lublin
1997; Sharpe and Garand 1994, unpublished; Overby and Cosgrove 1996). As the black
population in a district decreased due to redistricting, the House member’s roll-call
voting behavior becomes more conservative. However, in 1995 and 1996, House
members no longer appear to respond to the changes that occurred in the early 1990s.
Instead, they are concerned with the actual level of black population of their
constituency. According to the findings in Chapter 5, white House members are
“responsive” to the level of black population in their district, but there is an inverse
relationship. As the number of black constituents increased in 1995 and 1996, white
House members become more conservative in their roll-call voting behavior.
This finding is interesting considering the assumptions made in the dissertation.
According to rational actor theory, an incumbent House member interested in reelection
is expected to vote in a manner that is representative of the ideologies and preferences of
their constituency. The theory that white House members lose portions of their black
population due to race-based redistricting, and that the loss is reflected in more
conservative roll-call voting, is based on the premise that House members’ roll-call
voting behavior reflects the interests of their constituency in the first place.
Rational House members reacting to the loss of portions of their black
constituency due to redistricting became more conservative in their roll-call voting
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behavior directly after redistricting. Yet, it is questionable whether they exhibit rational
behavior in subsequent years.
The implications of these findings are complicated. House members responded to
the racial composition changes in 1993 by becoming more conservative. So, in 1995 and
1996, House members are already more conservative than they were before redistricting.
This is damaging to the representation of black interests. But further, it appears that
House members become increasingly conservative as the black population level in their
district grows.
Considering the findings, I offer two divergent explanations. First, one may claim
that it is impossible to deduce what ongoing effect the 1990s race-based redistricting has
had on the increased conservatism in the House, when it appears that white House
members’ in 1995 and 1996 disregard the interests of their black constituency. This
indicates a tendency toward conservatism in the mid-1990s that is not related to the size
of the black constituency, and thus is not a delayed effect of race-based redistricting.
On the other hand, one could make the argument that this seeming lack of
consideration for the interests of the black constituency is in fact a delayed effect of the
1990s race-based redistricting. As stated above, majority-black districts were created by
transferring portions of black population from one district to another. It is plausible that
the loss in black population was large enough to justify the lack of responsiveness. In
other words, the black population in the “bleached” districts is so marginal, that there is
no need for the House member to consider it in his decision calculus. Thus, as the
findings indicate, the larger the black population, the more conservative the House
members’ roll-call voting behavior. In fact, the level of black population may no longer
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be large enough to warrant electoral concern on the part of the incumbent House member.
Further analysis is needed to determine what impact the lower levels of black population
have on the House members’ roll-call voting behavior. However, this may suggest that
House members are actually acting rationally by voting the interests of their reelection
constituency.
CANDIDATE EMERGENCE
The second factor examined is candidate emergence. In the 1994 and 1996 House
elections, the higher quality candidates were more likely to be Republican. This is true
however, only when considering all House challenges. When focusing exclusively on the
South, there does not seem to be a similar pattern. In fact, in the South, there is no
relationship between challengers’ party and the quality of challengers.
Borrowing from strategic politician theory once again, this suggests that there
were some national forces (e. g., Democratic president, midterm election) at work.
Considering national forces that indicated a shift in the partisan tides, it seems that high
quality Republican candidates ran for House seats throughout the nation.
The focus on local forces in the South does not yield the same conclusion that
prospective candidates are behaving strategically or rationally.
The “bleached” districts, which formed as a result of the creation of majorityblack districts in the South, did not attract more experienced and qualified Republican
candidates. This finding counters the contention made by Bullock (1995) that the
creation of majority-black districts indirectly leads to higher quality Republican
challengers.
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Another important point to be made is that House members’ who are
unresponsive to the changes in their racial composition are held accountable in
subsequent elections. In the context of this study the electorate does not hold them
accountable, but rather the prospective challenger holds them accountable. House
incumbents who were not responsive to redistricting induced changes in the racial
composition of their district were more likely to face high quality challengers in 1994.
This relationship is observed when examining the entire country as well as when focusing
exclusively on the southern region.
Again, this is in keeping with the strategic politician theory. As mentioned in
Chapter 3, the potential challengers may pay close attention to the roll-call voting
behavior of the incumbents in an effort to observe whether their behavior has changed as
to match constituency changes. This finding offers evidence that the prospective
challenger recognized the lack of responsiveness on the part of the incumbent as an
opportunity to defeat the incumbent.
To summarize, the findings in this dissertation indicate that the immediate effect
of the race-based redistricting of the 1990s was more conservative roll-call voting
behavior among white incumbent House members. However, the ongoing or delayed
effects of the redistricting that can be considered responsible for the continued increased
conservatism in the House, in terms of roll-call voting behavior or partisan membership
are questionable at most, and nonexistent at the least.
These findings challenge the validity of the contention that majority-black
districts, created to enhance black representation, actually jeopardize black representation
at the congressional level. The contention is rooted in the debate over substantive versus
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descriptive representation that is discussed in Chapter 2. The findings present an
interesting dilemma. It does not appear that the creation of majority-black districts has a
long term negative impact on black substantive representation. If this is the case then the
loss of majority-black districts will only impair the effectiveness of black representation
at the congressional level.
In fact, it is very difficult to determine what part the creation of majority-black
districts played in the conservatism that has swept the nation in the 1990s. Were there
more powerful forces at work? Did the timing of the court-ordered redistricting unjustly
implicate the majority-black district? These questions are difficult to answer. However,
two important factors must be considered. First of all, the creation of majority-black
districts coincided with the election of the first Democratic president in 12 years. The
significance of this relates to the argument over divided government and split-ticket
voting. If we accept Fiorina’s (1992) contention that voters purposely divide their vote,
then it would follow that the election of a Democratic president would be accompanied
by the election of a Republican congress. Explaining why this effect was not immediate
is outside of the scope of this dissertation. However, although Republicans did not win
control of the House in 1992, they have maintained control since their takeover in 1994.
The fact that the increase in conservative voting and quality Republican candidate
emergence was not limited to the South lends credence to the proposition that the
increased conservatism had less to do with the creation of majority-black districts and
more to do with an unrelated national trend. It is also important to note that the Senate,
unaffected by the race-based redistricting of the 1990s, also came under Republican
control in 1994.
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The second factor that must be considered is the realignment in the South. The
South remained a one-party system from shortly after Reconstruction to the 1990s. For
approximately 100 years, southern politics has been dominated by the Democratic Party.
Throughout the 1990s we began to witness a shift in the electoral base of the Republican
Party in the South. Many conservative Democrats no longer accept the stigma attached
to the Republican Party from the Civil War and Reconstruction period. In fact, several
conservative southern House members who identified with the Democratic Party largely
for electoral purposes switched their affiliation to the Republican Party in the 1990s.
Large portions of the southern white electorate that identified with the Democratic Party
also began to switch their party affiliation. It is important to recognize that both the
public officials and the white voters did not change their political ideology or philosophy.
They simply changed the party that they identified with. Thus, the rise in Republicanism
was seen throughout the South. As Kevin Hill (1995:400) illustrates, Republicans in the
South “ . . . gained seats in both districts losing blacks and those relatively unaffected by
racial redistricting. ...” Again it is difficult to determine what aspect of the increased
Republicanism can be attributed directly and exclusively to the creation of majority-black
districts.
According to the findings in this dissertation, descriptive representation does
seem to negatively impact substantive representation directly after race-based
redistricting. But this relationship does not continue throughout the 1990s. In other
words, the increase in the number of black House members in the 1990s, does not appear
to have a direct impact on the continued conservatism in the House in the 1990s.
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What does this mean for black representation as we head into the year 2000?
Through the issuance of several decisions in the 1990s, the Supreme Court solidified its
position on the creation of majority-minority districts. By the 1996 House elections,
many of the majority-black districts were dismantled. With this being the case, however,
most of the districts still remained overwhelmingly minority. All black incumbent House
members who ran for reelection in 1996 were successful. However, in the year 2000, a
new round of redistricting will begin. The question then becomes: what impact will the
2000 redistricting process have on the descriptive representation of blacks? Without the
federal directive to create majority-minority districts, the fate of the black Representative
is again largely at the mercy of the individual state. Of course there are safeguards in
place, including the 1982 Voting Rights Amendments, that will ensure that the
redistricting process does not revert back to that of the 1970s and 1980s. However, it is
very likely that the numbers of black House members will drop, but will substantive
black representation suffer?
There have been many arguments made explaining how blacks will achieve
power at the congressional level after the 2000 redistricting.
First of all, it is possible that, as observed in the 1996 congressional elections,
black incumbent House members will enjoy some level of incumbency advantage. Based
on several Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s, majority-minority districts were
dismantled, and new districts were drawn in time for the 1996 congressional elections.
All but one of the formerly majority-black districts had a large enough proportion of
blacks to ensure the reelection of the black incumbent. It is possible that several of the
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districts created in 2000 will retain a large enough black population that, while not a
majority, will still ensure the reelection of some of the black incumbent House members.
Incumbents have several opportunities to strengthen their chances of electoral
success. Incumbents enjoy advantages over challengers because of their name
recognition, ability to address constituency concerns, and their franking, or free mailing
privileges, to name a few. When reelection is the primary goal, incumbents will act in a
manner that maximizes these advantages. Black incumbent House members whose
districts are in jeopardy pending the results of the 2000 redistricting, can begin preparing
themselves for the changes that may occur. In particular, the most important factor in
incumbency advantage is pleasing the constituency. Recognizing that a shift in
constituency is possible, these House members can heighten their focus on pleasing and
servicing as many constituents as possible. Anticipating these changes, the black
incumbents can attempt to do everything in their power to position themselves to be
recognized as hardworking and productive incumbent House members. This may
dampen claims that they are black incumbent House members only in office due to court
ordered redistricting and only concerned with the interests of the black portion of the
constituency.
This first argument assumes of course that the 2000 redistricting does not
completely overhaul current redistricting plans. However, there is the very real
possibility that this type of descriptive representation will be diminished after the 2000
redistricting.
In the last several years, the Congressional Black Caucus experienced an
increased level of influence due to its sheer numbers. With close to 40 black Democrats
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in the House, they served as a formidable voting bloc. However, the decrease in numbers
that is anticipated after the 2000 redistricting will reduce some aspects of their influence.
One area where blacks may possibly exercise increased influence however is in their role
as the more senior members in Congress. This argument, proposed by Gerber (1996), is
introduced in Chapter 2. With the high rate of turnover in the House in the 1990s, many
black incumbents who were elected in the 1970s and 1980s now enjoy a high level of
seniority. These black House members are elected in “historically black districts” and
experience high levels of voter loyalty (Swain 1993). This voter loyalty translates into
continued electoral success for House members from these districts.
An important point to make here is that the senior status of black House members
does not yield power and influence when Democrats are the minority party in the House.
The only way that the seniority of black House members will benefit the congressional
influence and representation of blacks is if the Democratic Party regains control of the
House. If one accepts Fiorina’s purposive split-ticket voting theory, black congressional
power may be contingent on what political party wins the presidency. Another factor to
consider will be to what extent the Republican elected in the 1990s enjoy high levels of
incumbency advantage.
After the year 2000, there will be a new challenge to elect black House members.
Two factors will influence whether blacks are successful in their bid for House election.
The first factor deals explicitly with the electoral system. Will districts be drawn in a
manner that will enable or allow the election of black Representative? The second factor
focuses on the role of the black population. The size of the black adult population and
the black electorate need to be the same. In other words, blacks must be a politically
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active and mobilized force in these southern districts where their numbers are high, but
not high enough to constitute a majority. Blacks must focus on the factor that is directly
in their power to control.
As stated throughout this dissertation, reelection is the primary goal of incumbent
House members. Thus, House members respond to that part of their constituency that
they consider their reelection constituency, regardless of race. If blacks prove to be an
important and influential voting bloc, white House members will respond to that power.
As Swain maintained in 1993, before, the fate of the majority-minority district was
revealed, blacks must be a politically active and vocal force in congressional politics.
Considering the sequence of events leading up to the 1990s redistricting, it is
unlikely that the redistricting process will revert back to the way it was before the
passage of the 1982 Voting Rights Amendments. After all, the racial gerrymandering of
the past is still considered a violation of the law. With this said, it is possible that in
place of the district plan that effectively dispersed the black population throughout the
state, there will be several districts that have at least 40% black population. These
“minority influence” districts can serve as an important tool for obtaining influencing
politics at the congressional level.
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court has not heard the last of this debate.
However, the current membership of the Court has made their position on the topic of
majority-minority districts clear. Thus, although there will continue to be litigation on
this topic in the future, blacks must decide what they can do currently do combat the
negative consequences of the Courts’ 1990s decisions.
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Now more than ever, prospective black House candidates in the South, must
consider a strategy of deracialized politics. Black candidates who employ such a strategy
de-emphasize race in an effort to win the support of white members of the electorate.
Again, in districts that have a sizable black population, black candidates may attempt to
broaden their electoral base slightly by focusing on issues that affect lower class citizens
of all races for instance. Douglas Wilder’s successful bid for Virginia governor in 1989
has largely been attributed to his pro-choice stand during a time when abortion issues
were at the center of many Virginians’ attention.
The application of deracialized strategy conflicts with the goal of substantive
representation. In particular, if black candidates are concerning themselves with issues
that affect the white majority in their district, descriptive representation may be achieved,
but substantive representation of black interests is not achieved.
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I contend that there is a direct and indirect relationship
between the creation of majority-black districts and increased conservatism in the House.
The direct relationship focuses on the roll-call voting behavior of the House member.
The indirect relationship focuses on the partisan makeup of the House. The theory
supporting this contention is that incumbent House members as well as prospective
House candidates are rational actors whose goal is electoral success. Thus, their actions
will maximize their chances of achieving this goal.
There does seem to be evidence that incumbent House members as well as
prospective House candidates are rational actors. Incumbent House members act
rationally in 1993 and 1994 when they change their roll-call voting behavior to better

144

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

reflect their altered constituency. However, they do not act rationally in the mid-1990s
when their roll-call voting behavior fails to reflect the level of the black population in
their district.
Prospective House candidates also act rationally when they run for election in
districts in which incumbent House members may be vulnerable because they have not
been responsive to the racial changes that occurred in their district. There is also
evidence that prospective house members did not take advantage of the possible added
vulnerability of incumbent House members in the South affected by race-based
redistricting.
Although there is evidence to support rational actor theory, the evidence is mixed
on whether incumbent House members and prospective House candidates, acting
strategically, increased the conservatism in the U. S. House of Representatives in the
1990s. The 1990s redistricting does represent a dynamic process, with the effects still
being felt. With this in mind, we begin to prepare for a new round of redistricting.
In anticipation of the 2000 redistricting process, scholars and political pundits
have begun to speculate on what impact the 2000 plans will have on the partisan and
racial composition of the House of Representatives. The expectation is that the
descriptive representation of blacks will decrease. Many civil rights activists claim that
descriptive and substantive black representation is inseparable. If one accepts this
contention, overall black representation will be jeopardized.
If one believes that even with the expected changes blacks will continue to exert
influence in the House of Representatives, the question then becomes how much
influence will they have and through what avenue?
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In 1949 V. O. Key proclaimed that southern politics was dominated by race. The
predominant role of race was due to the fact that the South was composed of a large black
population and a prejudice white population that continually constructed obstacles toward
black advancement and enfranchisement. Arguably, race still dominates politics in the
South. In the 1990s the most dramatic aspect of the redistricting process was the creation
of majority-minority districts. Now as we brace ourselves for the new millenium, fifty
years after Key (1949) made his profound statement, issues of race continue to dominate
the redistricting process in the South.
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